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I. INTRODUCTION 
In preparing teaching materials for an advanced contracts class, one 
of the authors retrieved a number of written warranties to use as 
examples.  This process exposed many instances of overly long, 
complicated and unwieldy warranties, as well as those that violated the 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission Improvement 
Act (MMWA or Act).1  In particular, many written warranties disclaimed 
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) implied warranties even though 
the MMWA prohibits such disclaimers.  Additional research of cases 
involving MMWA claims indicated fewer consumer warranty actions 
than one would have expected.  Further, that same research revealed that 
courts were substantially limiting the reach of the MMWA as applied to 
private causes of action. 
A recent law review article by one of the authors focused specifically 
on this justiciability problem.2  Specifically, the article focused on one of 
the MMWA’s strategic purposes of providing a federal private cause of 
action for violations of written and implied warranties, criticizing the 
court cases that incorrectly limited that private cause of action.3  In some 
instances, the courts that limited the private cause of action justified the 
limitation by contending that a consumer’s access to a MMWA claim 
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 1.  Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-
637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312 (2012)) [hereinafter Magnuson-Moss 
Act]. 
 2.  Janet W. Steverson, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 18 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 155 (2014). 
 3.  Id. 
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must align with the Act’s other purposes, specifically, the policing of 
misleading written warranties.4  Although the authors believe that the 
courts are incorrect to focus on some of the MMWA’s strategic purposes 
to the exclusion of others, the courts’ focus raised the question of 
whether the MMWA had achieved the Act’s other aims, even as private 
causes of action appeared to be neglected. 
This question regarding the other purposes of the MMWA, the dearth 
of practical legal scholarship on the topic, and the discovery of many 
problematic written warranties spawned the research that led to this 
article.  The research revealed that, in many ways, the MMWA is not 
achieving its goal of curtailing misleading warranties.  First, one part of 
the research was an empirical analysis of contemporary written 
warranties to determine whether the authors’ anecdotal information 
concerning problematic warranties was borne out across multiple 
products and product categories.  This analysis demonstrated that many 
of the current warranties do, in fact, violate the MMWA.  A second area 
of research involved assessing the effectiveness of both public 
enforcement through Federal Trade Commission (FTC) actions and 
private enforcement through consumer suits.  This research demonstrated 
that there is a decided lack of enforcement of the MMWA provisions.  
Thus, MMWA violations are likely to continue to flourish to the 
detriment of the consumer.  In order to breathe new life into the Act and 
provide better consumer warranty protection, this article proposes some 
changes in FTC policy and some changes in the MMWA to allow for 
greater enforcement of the Act’s provisions.  Part II of the article 
explains the MMWA’s history and goals to illustrate the nature and 
necessity of the consumer protection that the MMWA hoped to provide.  
Part III outlines the problems in current warranties that the authors’ 
empirical research revealed, while Part IV demonstrates the lack of 
enforcement of the MMWA.  Finally, Part V posits a multi-faceted 
solution to the problems outlined in Parts III and IV. 
 
                                                 
 4.  See, e.g., McNamara v. Nomeco Bldg. Specialties, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1174–75 (D. 
Minn. 1998) (explaining that because the purpose of the MMWA was to police against deceptive 
written warranty practices, there was no evidence that Congress intended to allow a federal cause of 
action for state implied warranties where the supplier had not given a written warranty). 
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II. STATED AIMS OF THE MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY–
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION IMPROVEMENT ACT 
In 1975, in response to concerns that consumers were being misled 
by specious warranties on consumer goods, Congress enacted the 
MMWA.5  The primary impetus behind the MMWA was to allow buyers 
of consumer products to make informed choices as to which products to 
purchase by curtailing the use of misleading warranties by the sellers of 
consumer products.6  In addition to this goal, however, the MMWA had 
other strategic aims that were vital to the protection of consumers from 
defective goods.  This section will put the MMWA into its historical 
context to enable the reader to understand the current obstacles that limit 
the MMWA’s ability to achieve its intended purposes.  The section will 
then delineate the Act’s strategic purposes, as one must know these 
strategic purposes in order to determine whether they have been 
achieved. 
A. Context and History of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal 
Improvement Act 
The MMWA was enacted in 1975.7  At that time, there was no 
federal regulation in the area of warranties; regulation was left to the 
states.  At the state level, the UCC had been adopted by all except 
Louisiana, seemingly providing strong warranty protection to buyers 
through its implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a 
particular purpose.8  With the implied warranty of merchantability in 
particular, if a good was defective, a consumer had a breach of warranty 
action against any seller dealing in goods of the kind.9  In the consumer 
good arena, however, manufacturers and retail sellers quickly learned 
                                                 
 5.  Magnuson-Moss Act, 88 Stat. 2183 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312). 
 6.  120 CONG. REC. 40,711 (1974) (statement of Sen. Moss) (“By making warranties of 
consumer products clear and understandable through creating a uniform terminology of warranty 
coverage, consumers will for the first time have a clear and concise understanding of the terms of 
warranties of products they are considering purchasing.”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 93-1107, at 20 
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 1974 WL 11709 (stating a need to make warranties 
“more readily understood”); S. REP. NO. 93-151, at 6 (1973) (indicating the Act was intended to 
further a larger purpose of “promot[ing] consumer understanding” of written warranties). 
 7.  Magnuson-Moss Act, 88 Stat. 2183 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312). 
 8.  U.C.C. §§ 2-314–15 (2012). 
 9.  U.C.C. § 2-314 (in every contract of sale with a merchant in goods of that kind, there is an 
implied warranty that the goods shall be merchantable—i.e., that the goods would, inter alia, “pass 
without objection in the trade . . . [and be] fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are 
used”). 
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that they could bypass the UCC warranties by providing complicated 
written warranties that seemed to promise much, but actually provided 
little, and that, at the same time, disclaimed the UCC implied 
warranties.10 
In the late 1950s and the early 1960s, the consumer’s limited access 
to a remedy for defective products, coupled with the booming market for 
automobiles11 and the burgeoning availability of consumer goods such as 
radios, televisions, and various household appliances,12 led to a rising 
tide of complaints concerning motor vehicles,13 household appliances,14 
and other consumer products.15  In particular, the FTC was receiving 
increasing complaints about manufacturers and their warranties.  The 
first major source of many of the complaints came from the owners of 
motor vehicles who began to inundate the FTC beginning in the late 
1950s.16  These complaints indicated that manufacturers or dealers were 
not living up to the terms of their warranties, that the automobiles “were 
unsafe, poorly designed, [and] noisy,”17 and that neither the 
manufacturers nor the dealers cured the defects.18 
The second major source of complaints emanated from owners of 
major appliances.  In a study of warranties for major appliances, 
President Johnson’s 1968 task force19 reported that (1) manufacturers had 
                                                 
 10.  H.R. REP. NO. 93-1107, at 24 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 1974 WL 
11709 (in many cases, the warranties provided very little warranty protection while at the same time 
taking away the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness). 
 11.  Id. at 22 (“In 1896 the year marking the beginning of the American motor vehicle industry, 
thirteen cars of the same design were produced by an organized company.  In 1971, 75 years later 
over 8.5 million passenger cars were produced in the United States [sic].”). 
 12.  Id. at 22–23 (providing details concerning the vast sums of money spent by consumers on 
common home appliances). 
 13.  Id. at 25 (“Beginning in the late 1950’s a rising tide of complaints was received by 
Members and committees of the Congress, the Federal Trade Commission, and other officials and 
agencies of the Federal Government from irate owners of motor vehicles . . . .”). 
 14.  See id. at 27 (stating that “[m]anufacturers, servicing dealers, and independent service 
companies [of major appliances] are aware that consumer dissatisfaction with the manner of 
performance under warranties is quite prevalent”). 
 15.  See 120 CONG. REC. 31,315 (1974) (statement of Rep. Staggers) (“The litany of complaints 
flooding Washington is a long one: cars that break down, appliances that would not work, TV sets 
and toys that pose safety hazards. What is more, many claim sellers are indifferent to complaints.”); 
115 CONG. REC. 31,484 (1969) (Senator Magnuson, in introducing S. 3074, stated that “Senate 
Commerce Committee correspondence files testify to the high level of consumer frustration 
generated by unreliable products guaranteed in name, but not in fact”).   
 16.  H.R. REP. NO. 93-1107, at 25 (“During this period as many letters were received by the 
FTC on this subject as on any other since the Commission was established in 1914.”). 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  In his February 6, 1968, message to the Congress, President Johnson established a Task 
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not lived up to their obligations; (2) consumers lacked the ability to 
compel manufacturers or retailers to perform their warranty obligations; 
(3) a number of warranties were deceptively captioned; (4) consumers 
did not understand the warranties due, in part, to the content and 
terminology of the warranty; (5) almost all major appliance warranties 
disclaimed any liability under the implied warranties of the UCC; and (6) 
the majority of major appliance warranties contained “exceptions and 
exclusions which are unfair to the purchaser and which are unnecessary 
from the standpoint of protecting the manufacturer from unjustified 
claims or excessive liability.”20 
As a result of consumer complaints, consumer protection became an 
oft-revisited topic in Presidential speeches and communications.21  
Further, in response to the complaints, in a 1970 report on automobile 
warranties, the FTC proposed enacting a statutory obligation on 
manufacturers to provide defect-free automobiles and to honor their 
warranties.22  Subsequently, Congress held committee hearings in 1970 
and 1971 focusing on consumer product warranties.23  The ultimate result 
of Congress’s work was Public Law 93-637, commonly referred to as the 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, enacted on January 4, 1975.24 
 
                                                 
 
Force on Appliance Warranties and Service that was comprised of the Special Assistant to the 
President for Consumer Affairs, the Chairman of the FTC, the Secretary of Commerce, and the 
Secretary of Labor.  Id. at 24. 
 20.  Id. at 28 (referring to the Task Force’s Feb. 6, 1968 report).  The report was based on a 
study conducted by the FTC of “over 200 warranties used by 50 manufacturers of major appliances.”  
Id. at 27. 
 21.  See, e.g., President John F. Kennedy, Special Message to Congress on Protecting 
Consumer Interest (Mar. 15, 1962), available at http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/ 
Archives/JFKPOF-037-028.aspx (a message from President Kennedy was the first Presidential 
Message on consumer interests).  See also H.R. REP. NO. 93-1107, at 24 (indicating that, since 
President Kennedy’s 1962 message, “six additional Presidential Messages on consumer matters 
ha[d] been submitted to the Congress”).  Those six included President Johnson’s message on Feb. 6, 
1968, creating a task force on appliance warranties and service, President Nixon’s message on Nov. 
3, 1969, activating a task force to comment on the need for guarantee and warranty legislation in the 
household appliance industries and in other fields, and President Nixon’s message on Mar. 1, 1971, 
proposing a Fair Warranty Disclosure Act.  Id. at 24–25. 
 22.  CASPAR W. WEINBERGER ET AL., FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT ON AUTO. WARRANTIES 
69 (1970). 
 23.  See H.R. REP. NO. 93-1107, at 29 (stating that hearings were held by the Subcommittee on 
Commerce and Finance each day on September 29th through October 1st in 1970, and again each day 
of September 28th and 29th, and of October 12th through 15th in 1971).  
 24.  Magnuson-Moss Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183, 2183 (1975) (Codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312 (2012)). 
232 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
B. The Act’s Strategic Purposes 
Throughout the Act’s circuitous route through the House and Senate, 
the House and Senate committees discussed both the goals and the 
implementation of the legislation.25  The main goals were as follows: to 
promote greater consumer understanding of warranties;26 to “[e]nsure 
consumers certain basic protections when they purchase consumer 
products which have written warranties”;27 to “improve the position of 
the consumer in the marketplace by making the Federal agency 
responsible for his economic well being (the F.T.C.) more effective”;28 
and to allow the consumer “to economically pursue his own remedies 
when a supplier of a consumer product breaches a voluntarily assumed 
warranty or service contract obligation.”29  The MMWA itself mirrors 
some of these aims and adds others when it states that it is an Act “[t]o 
provide minimum disclosure standards for written consumer product 
warranties; to define minimum Federal content standards for such 
warranties; to amend the Federal Trade Commission Act in order to 
improve its consumer protection activities; and for other purposes.”30 
It is important to understand, however, that the Act was designed to 
address deficiencies in the state warranty protection legislation that 
existed at the time.31  It “was not designed to completely supplant the 
state law of warranties and sales but, instead, to provide a basic level of 
honesty and reliability to the entire transaction.”32  Through an analysis 
of the Act and its legislative history, this section will elaborate on the 
four basic purposes that Congress hoped to serve via the MMWA.  In 
particular, the section will focus on the legislative reports on the 1973 
                                                 
 25.  See, e.g., id.; S. REP. NO. 93-151 (1973) (Senate Commerce Committee); H.R. REP. NO. 
93-1107 (House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce). 
 26.  S. REP. NO. 93-151, at 6–7; H.R. REP. NO. 93-1107, at 29. 
 27.  S. REP. NO. 93-151, at 7. 
 28.  Id. at 2. 
 29.  Id. (The report indicated that “this bill aims to increase the ability of the consumer to make 
more informed product choices and to enable him to economically pursue his own remedies when a 
supplier of a consumer product breaches a voluntarily assumed warranty or service contract 
obligation”).  The report also stated that in order to ensure warrantor performance, there was a need 
to monetarily penalize a warrantor for non-performance and award that penalty to the consumer.  Id. 
at 7. 
 30.  Magnuson-Moss Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183, 2183 (1975) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312 (2012)). 
 31.  CAROLYN L. CARTER ET AL., CONSUMER WARRANTY LAW 35 n.2 (4th ed. 2010) (citing 
Skelton v. Gen. Motors Corp., 500 F. Supp. 1181, 1190 (N.D. Ill. 1980), rev’d on other grounds, 660 
F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1981)). 
 32.  Id. 
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Senate bill that eventually became the MMWA, S. 356,33 and the 1974 
House bill that contributed to the MMWA, H.R. 7917.34 
1. Promote Consumer Understanding 
The first strategic purpose as identified in the legislative history and 
embodied in the Act relates to creating an informed consumer.  As the 
Senate Report stated, the MMWA was intended to pursue a larger 
purpose of “promot[ing] consumer understanding” of written 
warranties.35  The House Report mirrored this intent in stating a need to 
make warranties “more readily understood.”36  In fulfilling this goal, the 
bill hoped to enable the consumer “to make more informed product 
choices.”37 
The Act utilized two mechanisms to promote greater consumer 
understanding.  The first was “to provide minimum disclosure standards 
for written consumer product warranties.”38  In particular, the Act 
required simplicity in the labeling of warranties;39 through clarification 
of product labeling, the Senate Report indicated that the bill satisfied the 
need to identify for the consumer which products are fully warranted.40  
It was hoped that clarifying the rules of the warranty game would enable 
consumers to differentiate between more or less reliable products.41  This 
ability to differentiate would, in turn, lead consumers to purchase the 
more reliable products and produce economic rewards for the suppliers 
of such products.42  The House Report stated a similar, albeit more 
specific, purpose of “prohibiting the proliferation of classes of warranties 
on consumer products and requiring that such warranties be either a full 
or limited warranty with the requirements of a full warranty clearly 
stated.”43 
                                                 
 33.  S. 356, 93rd Cong. (1973). 
 34.  H.R. 7917, 93rd Cong. (1973). 
 35.  S. REP. NO. 93-151, at 6 (1973). 
 36.  H.R. REP. NO. 93-1107, at 20 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 1974 WL 
11709. 
 37.  S. REP. NO. 93-151, at 2. 
 38.  Magnuson-Moss Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183, 2183 (1975) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312 (2012)). 
 39.  Magnuson-Moss Act § 102(A). 
 40.  S. REP. NO. 93-151, at 8. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  H.R. REP. NO. 93-1107, at 29 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 1974 WL 
11709. 
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In addition to its labeling requirements, the Act sought to promote 
consumer understanding by requiring greater clarity in the language used 
to describe the warranty.44  The bill’s supporters felt that clearer 
language was needed because in many cases, the warranties offered by 
suppliers failed to communicate to the consumer what the supplier was 
offering.45  Further, the House Report indicated that President Nixon, in a 
message to Congress on March 1, 1971, stated that “[g]uarantees and 
warranties are often found to be unclear or deceptive.”46 
2. Provide Basic Consumer Protections 
The second strategic purpose, as stated in the Senate Report, was to 
“[e]nsure consumers certain basic protections when they purchase 
consumer products which have written warranties.”47  The Act intended 
to achieve this purpose by “defin[ing the] minimum federal content 
standards for such warranties.”48  In particular, the Act was to create 
standards for warranties that the supplier designated as “full.”49  In 
addition to ensuring basic protections through standardization of full 
written warranties, both the Senate Report and the House Report 
concluded that these basic protections could be achieved by prohibiting a 
supplier from disclaiming the implied warranties when giving a written 
warranty.50  As the House Report stated: 
in many cases where a warranty or guarantee was ostensibly given the 
old saying applied “The bold print giveth and the fine print taketh 
away.”  For the paper [on which the warranty was written] operated to 
take away from the consumer the implied warranties of merchantability 
and fitness arising by operation of law leaving little in its stead.51 
By establishing minimum standards in addition to the labeling 
requirements, the Act intended to address these concerns. 
                                                 
 44.  S. REP. NO. 93-151, at 7 (the Act sought to improve consumer understanding by “clearly 
and conspicuously disclosing the terms and conditions of the warranty and by telling the consumer 
what to do if his guaranteed product becomes defective or malfunctions”). 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  H.R. REP. NO. 93-1107, at 25. 
 47.  S. REP. NO. 93-151, at 7. 
 48.  Magnuson-Moss Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183, 2183 (1975) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312 (2012)). 
 49.  S. REP. NO. 93-151, at 8. 
 50.  Id. at 7; H.R. REP. No. 93-1107, at 29 (stating a need for “safeguards against the disclaimer 
or modification of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness on consumer products where 
a written warranty is given with respect thereto”). 
 51.  H.R. REP. NO. 93-1107, at 24. 
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3. Make the FTC More Effective 
The Act’s third strategic purpose was to “improve the position of the 
consumer in the marketplace by making the Federal agency responsible 
for his economic well being (the F.T.C.) more effective.”52  Thus, the Act 
was designed “to amend the Federal Trade Commission Act in order to 
improve [the FTC’s] consumer protection activities.”53  Such amendment 
was needed because, although the 1938 Wheeler-Lea Act54 granted the 
FTC the power to police “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce,”55 Congress did not expand the FTC’s enforcement 
powers.56  Rather, except for the partial expansion of powers in the area 
of food, drug, and cosmetic advertising, the cease-and-desist order was 
the only tool available to the FTC for enforcement of § 5(a)(1) of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act.57  Even at the time of the enactment of 
the Wheeler-Lea Act, the cease-and-desist order was felt to be fairly 
anemic because a potential violator would only be deterred from such 
action if he knew that, at some time in the future, he could be “held 
accountable by a criminal or civil penalty action.”58  Further, in each 
subsequent decade, commentators decried the FTC’s inability to 
adequately enforce this section of the Federal Trade Commission Act.59 
4. Provide Consumer Redress 
Finally, the MMWA’s fourth strategic purpose was to enable the 
consumer “to economically pursue his own remedies when a supplier of 
a consumer product breaches a voluntarily assumed warranty or service 
contract obligation.”60  The House Report mirrored this goal in stating a 
need to provide consumers with “reasonable and effective remedies” 
when a warrantor has breached its warranty on a consumer product.61  
                                                 
 52.  S. REP. NO. 93-151, at 2. 
 53.  Magnuson-Moss Act, 88 Stat. at 2183 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312). 
 54.  Wheeler-Lea Act, Pub. L. No. 75-447, 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45 
(2012 & Supp. I 2014)). 
 55.  15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2). 
 56.  S. REP. NO. 93-151, at 9. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. (quoting the House Committee reporting the Wheeler-Lea Act). 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. at 2 (stating that in order to ensure warrantor performance, there was a need to 
monetarily penalize a warrantor for non-performance and award that penalty to the consumer). 
 61.  H.R. REP. NO. 93-1107, at 29 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 1974 WL 
11709. 
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This fourth purpose stems from Congress’s concern with suppliers who 
put defective products into the stream of commerce.  Such suppliers are 
to be held accountable through private warranty actions, both written and 
implied.  In addition to providing for private redress, Congress hoped 
that allowing for warranty enforcement in the courts would encourage 
suppliers to develop workable informal dispute settlement procedures for 
the “expeditious settlement of consumer complaints.”62 
Congress’s fourth strategic purpose is manifested in § 110(d)(1) of 
the MMWA,63 whereby “[t]he Magnuson-Moss Act created a federal 
remedy for breach of written and implied warranties falling within the 
statute.”64  Thus, § 110(d)(1) is one of the most important provisions of 
the MMWA for a consumer who has been harmed by a defective 
consumer product.  It allows any consumer—defined as the purchaser or 
transferee of a consumer product65—to sue a broad class of persons “for 
damages and other legal and equitable relief” caused by a defective 
consumer product.66  Specifically, the Act authorizes four independent 
causes of action: failure to comply with (or breach of) any obligation 
                                                 
 62.  S. REP. NO. 93-151, at 8. 
 63.  Magnuson-Moss Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 110(d)(1), 88 Stat. 2183, 2191 (1975) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) (2012)). 
 64.  Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 874 (Iowa 1996) (citing Alberti v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
600 F. Supp. 1026, 1027 (D.D.C. 1985)).  This point has been expressed by several other courts.  
See, e.g., Milicevic v. Fletcher Jones Imps., Ltd., 402 F.3d 912, 918 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting 
Richardson v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 254 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2001)) (stating that the 
MMWA provides “a federal remedy for breach of written and implied warranties”); Rentas v. 
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 936 So. 2d 747, 750 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the MMWA 
“provide[s] an independent federal cause of action for breach of warranty”); Royal Lincoln-Mercury 
Sales, Inc. v. Wallace, 415 So. 2d 1024, 1026 (Miss. 1982) (stating that the MMWA “creates a new 
federal cause of action for the breach of warranties”);  see also S. REP. NO. 93-151, at 2–3 (1973) 
(“If a supplier fails to honor his warranty or service contract promises, the consumer can avail 
himself of certain specified remedies . . . . [I]f the consumer is not satisfied with the results obtained 
in any informal dispute settlement proceeding, the consumer can pursue his legal remedies in a court 
of competent jurisdiction . . . .”); Christopher Smith, Private Rights of Action Under the Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act, in WARRANTIES IN THE SALE OF BUSINESS EQUIPMENT AND CONSUMER 
PRODUCTS 1985, 225 (Barkley Clark & Christopher Smith eds., 1985) (Magnuson-Moss creates four 
separate federal causes of action: breach of written warranty, implied warranty, service contract, or 
Magnuson-Moss provisions).  A few courts have found that the MMWA only applies to written 
warranties.  See, e.g., Thomas v. Micro Ctr. Inc., 875 N.E.2d 108, 112 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (“It 
follows that with no written warranty . . . appellant could not, as a matter of law, prevail on any 
Magnuson-Moss warranty claim . . . .”).  However, the clear language of 15 U.S.C. § 2310 
demonstrates that these courts are in error.  15 U.S.C. § 2310 (2012).  
 65.  15 U.S.C. § 2301(3).  In addition to the buyer and the transferee of a consumer product, the 
MMWA also defines a consumer as “any other person who is entitled by the terms of such warranty 
(or service contract) or under applicable State law to enforce against the warrantor (or service 
contractor) the obligations of the warranty (or service contract).”  Id. 
 66.  Magnuson-Moss Act § 110(d)(1) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1)).  
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under the MMWA, a written warranty, an implied warranty,67 and a 
service contract.68  The requirements for creating written warranties and 
service contracts are found in the provisions of the MMWA,69 but the 
requirements for creating an implied warranty are found in state law.70  
Only a consumer can bring these actions; however, the actions may be 
brought against three types of entities: suppliers, warrantors, and service 
contractors.71 
Coupled with the federal causes of action is the provision for 
attorneys’ fees that provides the means by which such suits may be 
brought.72  Together, the four federal causes of action and the availability 
of attorneys’ fees cast a net wide enough to monetarily penalize all 
suppliers of defective products.  Specifically, § 2310(d)(2) allows a 
finally-prevailing consumer to receive reasonable costs and expenses, 
including attorneys’ fees.73  As the Senate Report explained, the 
attorneys’ fees provision is a key component to the Act’s goal of forcing 
suppliers to live up to the promises made in the warranty.74  The Senate 
Report contended that warrantors who did not perform as promised 
needed to suffer direct economic detriment in order to have a strong 
enough incentive to perform.75  However, the damages sought in many 
breach of warranty cases would be relatively small because the price of 
the consumer product is not high.  If one couples this fact with the often-
expensive nature of litigation,76 it is easy to see how the majority of 
consumers would elect not to pursue a breach of warranty case.77  The 
                                                 
 67.  See Chase v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1291 (M.D. Ala. 
2001) (“[S]ection 2310(d) essentially provides a federal cause of action for breach of an implied 
warranty which arises under state law.”); Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 627 F. Supp. 1519, 1522 
(D.D.C. 1986) (the MMWA creates a private cause of action for the “failure of a warrantor or 
supplier to comply with the Act or with the obligations under a written warranty, implied warranty, 
or service contract”). 
 68.  S. REP. NO. 93-151, at 2–3. 
 69.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301(6), (8) (defining written warranty and service contract). 
 70. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(7) (an implied warranty means one arising under state law). 
 71.  Magnuson-Moss Act § 110(d)(1) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1)). 
 72.  Magnuson-Moss Act § 110(d)(2) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2)). 
 73.  15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2). 
 74.  S. REP. NO. 93-151, at 24 (1973) (“Th[e attorneys’ fees] provision would make 
economically feasible the pursuit of remedies by consumers in State and Federal courts.  It should be 
noted that an attorney’s fee is to be based upon actual time expended rather than being tied to any 
percentage of the recovery.  This requirement is designed to make the pursuit of consumer rights 
involving inexpensive consumer products economically feasible.”). 
 75.  Id. at 7. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Mace E. Gunter, Note, Can Warrantors Make an End Run? The Magnuson-Moss Act and 
Mandatory Arbitration in Written Warranties, 34 GA. L. REV. 1483, 1512–13 (2000) (citing Jean R. 
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attorneys’ fees provision sought to encourage consumers to pursue 
private redress. 
III. TEXTUAL PROBLEMS IN CURRENT WRITTEN WARRANTIES 
The initial research the authors conducted indicated that the MMWA 
might not be achieving some of the above-delineated strategic purposes.  
To determine whether their concerns were well-founded, the authors did 
an empirical analysis of contemporary warranties by replicating a 1978 
FTC study.  This replicated study revealed that the MMWA was no 
longer achieving two of its strategic purposes: promoting consumer 
understanding of written warranties and ensuring consumers certain basic 
protections when they purchase consumer products which have written 
warranties.  This section explains the methodology and conclusions of 
the first FTC study and the authors’ replicated study.  In doing so, it 
reveals where the MMWA is falling short of its goals. 
A. The Earlier FTC Study 
Following passage of the Act, reviews of the legislation and its 
impact were widespread, including critical reviews only a few years after 
its enactment.78  These critics posited that warranties were providing less 
protection and were simultaneously becoming more complex and 
legalistic under the Act’s requirements.79  Much of the data for these 
assertions came from a single survey conducted by the National 
Association of Service Managers (NASM).80  In this survey, nearly 2,000 
questionnaires were distributed to NASM members and prospective 
members—and 132 were returned (approximately a 6.6% return rate).81  
                                                 
 
Sternlight, Gateway Widens Door to Imposing Unfair Binding Arbitration on Consumers, 71 FLA. B. 
J. 8, 12 (1997)) (“For consumers with small warranty claims, the expense of attorneys’ fees makes 
bringing a claim impracticable.”). 
 78.  A sampling of reviews includes: Robert C. DeNicola, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: 
Making Consumer Product Warranty a Federal Case, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 273 (1975); Jonathan 
A. Eddy, Effects of the Magnuson-Moss Act Upon Consumer Product Warranties, 55 N.C. L. REV. 
835 (1977).  Critical reviews include Caroline E. Mayer, Why So Many Laws Turn Out to be 
Lemons, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 22, 1978, at 26; Warranty Protection Shrinking Under 
Magnuson-Moss: NASM, 1978 APPLIANCE SERV. NEWS 1 (1978). 
 79.  See, e.g., Warranty Protection Shrinking Under Magnuson-Moss: NASM, supra note 78, at 
13. 
 80.  Id.  
 81.  JACQUELINE SCHMITT ET AL., BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., IMPACT REPORT ON THE 
MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT: A COMPARISON OF 40 MAJOR CONSUMER PRODUCT 
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Of these 132, only 83 were deemed by NASM to be applicable to the 
protections of the MMWA.82  However, these responses were entirely 
self-reported and assessed;83 copies of the warranties were not reviewed, 
and as a result, the data set was, at best, a self-selected, rough 
approximation. 
In response to the NASM’s conclusions, the Bureau of Consumer 
Protection within the FTC conducted a more thorough study of warranty 
documents, culminating in a report issued in 1980.84  In this study, the 
staff selected forty warranties across four categories of major consumer 
purchases: household appliances, mobile homes/RVs, automobiles, and 
home entertainment.85  For each, they compared the warranty 
characteristics prior to passage of the Act (1974) and a few years 
following implementation (1977–78).86  The Bureau examined the 
warranties using five measures of warranty content: designations; 
coverage; readability; length of text; and frequency of certain limitations, 
exclusions, and disclaimers.87  In brief, the Bureau found that warranty 
coverage had increased, warranties had become longer though slightly 
more readable, and limitations on buyers’ rights in warranties had 
decreased.88  After nearly thirty-five years of living with the MMWA, the 
authors set out to replicate the analysis with contemporary warranties to 
look for differences.  More detailed information regarding the Bureau’s 
findings and the authors’ findings is contained in the subsections below. 
B. The Follow-up Study: Methodology 
In replicating the Bureau’s Impact Report, it is important to note that 
our analysis contains the same limitations that the original Impact Report 
contained.  First, the analysis is purely textual: to keep the analysis free 
from bias, both the Bureau and this article’s authors used only the 
language of the warranties.89  Consequently, even if a warranty’s 
                                                 
 
WARRANTIES FROM BEFORE AND AFTER THE ACT 9 (1980) [hereinafter IMPACT REPORT]. 
 82.  Id.  
 83.  See id. at 10 (stating that the survey only reflected the “perceptions” of the manufacturers 
who responded to the survey and not to the actual warranties offered by those manufacturers). 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. at 31. 
 86.  Id. at 11. 
 87.  Id. at 1. 
 88.  See id. at i. 
 89.  Id. at 2. 
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language indicates broad coverage, one cannot assume that the consumer 
is actually receiving the coverage provided.  Second, the warranties used 
were not necessarily representative of the most frequently-purchased 
products in the studied product categories, nor were they representative 
of all consumer products.  Finally, as in the Impact Report, this analysis 
does not control for the “changing technologies, marketing strategies, 
consumer demand,” and other variables that lead to changes in warranty 
offerings.90  Thus, one cannot necessarily attribute the changes that have 
occurred in the warranties to the MMWA or the FTC.91  Nevertheless, 
the Impact Report and the replicated analysis can provide a snapshot of 
warranty offerings and whether the warranties are in compliance with the 
MMWA. 
Using the 1980 Commission Report as a template, the methodology 
for this analysis was very similar.  First, model-year 2012 warranties 
were selected from forty different manufacturers, paralleling the 
originally-chosen manufacturers as much as possible.  Next, those 
warranties were gathered from the manufacturers or their resellers.  
Finally, numerical calculation and analysis was performed on the 
warranties themselves. 
1. Selecting the Warranties 
The first step in warranty analysis is determining which warranties to 
analyze.  In order to maintain as much longitudinality with the FTC 
analysis of 1977–78 warranties, the same companies’ warranties were 
used wherever possible.  Because of the intervening decades, however, 
this was not always possible due to corporate mergers, bankruptcies, or 
other changes.  Again, for long-term analysis, the authors kept the same 
mix of nineteen household appliance warranties, thirteen mobile 
home/RV warranties, four automobile warranties, and four home 
entertainment warranties.92 
The automobile category had the highest percentage of consistent 
manufacturers from 1977 to 2012.  Of the four originally chosen by the 
Commission (American Motors, Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors), 
only American Motors was no longer available.  Based on market share 
                                                 
 90.  Id. at 2–3. 
 91.  Id. at 3. 
 92.  Id. at 31.  For a crosswalk table of the manufacturers used in the original report and their 
analogs in the current analysis, see the appendix to this Article. 
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and pervasiveness, Honda was selected as a replacement for American 
Motors. 
Home entertainment is the category with perhaps the greatest change 
since 1977—not only in terms of the manufacturers sampled, but also the 
definition of home entertainment itself.  Of the manufacturers sampled 
by the Commission (JVC, KLH, Magnavox, and Zenith), only JVC 
remains as a stand-alone brand similar in form to what it was in the 
1970s.  To replace the three other manufacturers, the authors used a 2012 
conception of home entertainment and added Apple, Samsung, and 
Vizio.  Each of these manufacturers produces devices similar in purpose 
to KLH, Magnavox, and Zenith, and each represent significant market 
share in the American consumer market.93 
Household appliances is another category where both the technology 
and the companies have seen major change in the last thirty-five years.  
Of the original nineteen manufacturers (Admiral, Amana, Carrier, 
Emerson, Fedders, Friedrich, Frigidaire, General Electric, Gibson, 
Hardwick, Hoover, Kelvinator, Maytag, McGraw-Edison, Modern Maid, 
Roper, Tappan, Westinghouse, and Whirlpool), ten remain as stand-alone 
manufacturers in the same market niche.  For most of the remaining nine 
warranties, then, substitutions were made based on product line.  For 
instance, Roper was an independent manufacturer of refrigerators; in its 
place, Sub-Zero (a current manufacturer of refrigerators) was substituted.  
In two cases, substitutions were made to broaden the category of 
household appliances to include computing devices; in those cases, HP 
and Dell were used in place of appliance makers Gibson and Admiral, 
which are no longer independent manufacturers. 
Finally, the mobile home/RV category had undergone the most 
change between 1974 and 2012 with only five of the thirteen 
manufacturers remaining unchanged.  Two had merged into other listed 
manufacturers, and six were no longer operating in the mobile home/RV 
business.  To replace the eight warranties, manufacturers were selected in 
both the mobile/manufactured home and RV industries, in the same 
proportions as the old manufacturers.  Thus, Excel Homes, Clayton 
Homes, Fleetwood, Keystone, Tiffin Motorhomes, Gulf Stream Coach, 
and Jayco were added to the current list.  For additional details about 
                                                 
 93.  See Tom Morrod, Vizio Retakes Lead in U.S. LCD TV Market; Samsung Maintains Overall 
TV Dominance, NEXTINNOVATOR, (July 12, 2012), http://nextinnovator.com/index.php?articleID= 
32132&sectionID=269; U.S. Consumer Electronics Sales Reach $144 Billion in 2011, NPD GROUP, 
https://www.npd.com/wps/portal/npd/us/news/press-releases/pr_120213/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2014). 
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which manufacturers replaced those that had merged or left the business, 
see the Appendix to this article. 
2. Gathering the Warranties 
Once the manufacturers were selected, the next step was contacting 
the manufacturers or their resellers to get copies of the warranty.  The 
MMWA provides that “[t]he [Federal Trade] Commission shall prescribe 
rules requiring that the terms of any written warranty on a consumer 
product be made available to the consumer (or prospective consumer) 
prior to the sale of the product to him.”94  The Commission enacted rules 
in 1975 (amended in 1987) that require sellers to display the written 
warranty in close proximity to the product or to furnish it upon request 
and place attention-getting signs advising the consumer it is available.95  
In theory, then, it should be trivial to enter a manufacturer or dealer sales 
location, contact them in writing, or visit them on the Internet and get a 
warranty.  In practice, the experience varied widely from simple to 
maddeningly unsuccessful. 
The difficulty in obtaining warranty information tended to vary by 
product category.  Easiest to obtain were automobile and home 
entertainment warranties.  Each of the four home entertainment 
companies had their warranties on the manufacturer’s website, with the 
exception (at the time) of Apple; their warranty for specific products had 
to be obtained either by mail or at an Apple sales location.  Automobile 
warranties were easily found on their manufacturer’s website or by 
visiting a helpful dealer. 
Household appliances were slightly more involved, although only 
modestly so.  Of the nineteen household appliance warranties, fifteen of 
them were available online.  Three of the remaining four were easily 
obtained by visiting a reseller (Home Depot was particularly 
accommodating, dispatching a sales staffer to open one of the product’s 
boxes from the floor, remove the warranty, make photocopies of it, and 
then return the box to their stock).  Only one necessitated 
correspondence: Dell, who ironically requested that copies of warranties 
be obtained by mailing the manufacturer via the United States Postal 
Service. 
                                                 
 94.  Magnuson-Moss Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 102(b)(1)(A), 88 Stat. 2183, 2186 (1975) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)(A) (2012)). 
 95.  16 C.F.R. § 702.3(a) (2012). 
2015] THE MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT 243 
Mobile Homes and RVs proved to be the most difficult to obtain.  
While nearly half of the manufacturers have their warranties on their 
website, the majority do not.  Upon visiting dealers of both RVs and 
manufactured homes, multiple dealers turned away one author without a 
copy of the warranty, with the author being told that it was necessary to 
contact the manufacturer directly.  In the case of Tiffin Motorhomes, 
Commodore, and Excel, warranties eventually were received after 
visiting multiple dealers in multiple states.  Champion Homes never 
replied to any requests for warranties (via telephone, fax, or regular 
mail), and their resellers referred all inquiries back to the manufacturer.  
Ultimately, getting the warranty proved possible only through 
independently making contact with Champion owners, who searched 
their records and provided copies of their warranty. 
3. Warranty Analysis and Quantification 
Once obtained, each of the warranties was analyzed in a similar 
manner.  First, the designation of the warranty was established—“full,” 
“limited,” or “other.”  Then, detail about length of coverage and whether 
the warranty covered both parts and labor was gathered.  Next, 
limitations and disclaimers were reviewed: whether the warranty limited 
coverage to the original owner, whether the warranty disclaimed implied 
warranties, and whether the warranty limited consequential damages.  
Finally, a series of “readability counts” were made, including the number 
of syllables, the number of words, and the number of sentences.  From 
these readability counts, calculations could be made about the reading 
level and difficulty of the warranties. 
C. Results and Analysis 
Following the format of the original 1980 Commission Report, the 
results of the analysis focus on the designations of the warranties, the 
coverage provided, the readability of the written text, the length of the 
text, and any significant limitations or exclusions.96  Because the metrics 
of analysis, categories of warranty—and in many cases, the 
manufacturers—are the same between this analysis and that of the 
Commission, a comparison is drawn wherever possible. 
                                                 
 96.  IMPACT REPORT, supra note 81, at 13–25. 
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1. Designations 
Prior to the passage of the MMWA, there were no federal consumer 
labeling requirements or federal standards for warranties.97  The Act 
established standardized designations of “full” and “limited,” requiring 
manufacturers to assign one or both of these labels to a warranty.98  A 
supplier must meet the minimum coverage requirements of § 104 of the 
MMWA before it can label the warranty as full.99  The first requirement 
for full warranties was that they must, “for the time period specified,” 
give consumers “full remedies.”100  In this case, a full remedy means 
giving the consumer a replacement of the product or a refund “if the 
warrantor has been given a ‘reasonable’ number of attempts to repair the 
product and the repairs have not been successful,” remedying defects 
without charge, and remedying defects without charging for 
transportation or travel.101  Further, a full warranty may not disclaim the 
state law implied warranties;102 limit the duration of implied 
warranties;103 require a registration card to prove date of purchase;104 or 
“impose any unreasonable duty as a condition of warranty coverage.”105  
While a warranty that is designated as limited need not comply with the 
§ 104 requirements outlined above, a supplier who gives a limited 
warranty may not disclaim the state law implied warranties.106 
In the “designations” measure of warranty content, the Bureau 
measured the changes in warranty designation from “full” to “limited.”107  
The Bureau found that after the Act’s enactment, most warranty 
designations had either stayed the same or changed from limited to 
full.108  Specifically, using the Act’s standards, prior to the enactment of 
the MMWA, most of the warranties offered were limited (only six of the 
forty qualified as full).109  In 1977–78, warranty coverage had increased 
                                                 
 97.  Id. at 13. 
 98.  Magnuson-Moss Act § 103(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2303(a)). 
 99.  Magnuson-Moss Act § 103(a)(1) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2303(a)(1)). 
 100.  IMPACT REPORT, supra note 81, at 13. 
 101.  Id.; see also Magnuson-Moss Act § 104(a)(1)–(4) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(1)–(4)). 
 102.  Magnuson-Moss Act §§ 104(a)(2), 108(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2304(a)(2), 2308(a)). 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Magnuson-Moss Act § 104(b)(1) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2304(b)(1)). 
 105.  IMPACT REPORT, supra note 81, at 13.  See also Magnuson-Moss Act § 104(b)(1) (codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 2304(b)(1)). 
 106.  Magnuson-Moss Act § 108 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2308). 
 107.  See IMPACT REPORT, supra note 81, at 1, 3. 
 108.  Id. at 14. 
 109.  Id. 
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because seventeen of the forty warranties qualified as full, with only two 
companies switching from a full warranty designation to a limited 
warranty designation.110 
 The authors’ replicated study demonstrates that not only have full 
warranty designations dropped below the 1977–78 level, but they have 
also dropped below the 1974, pre-MMWA, level.  Specifically, in the 
replicated study, only five warranties were designated as full, while 
thirty-seven were designated as limited.  One warranty document carried 
no designation at all.  Note that these numbers exceed the forty 
warranties because three of the five full warranties carried both a limited 
and a full designation. 
 
 1977–78 Warranties 2012 Warranties 
Full 17      42.5% 5   12.5% 
Limited 23      57.5% 37   92.5% 
No Designation 0        0.0% 1     2.5% 
Table 1.  Full and Limited Designations, 1977–78 vs. 2012. 
 
 Full Limited No Designation 
Household Appliances 4       21.1% 18   94.7% 0 0.0% 
Mobile Home/RV 1         7.7% 11   84.6% 1 7.7% 
Automobiles 0         0.0% 4 100.0% 0 0.0% 
Home Entertainment 0         0.0% 4 100.0% 0 0.0% 
Table 2.  Full and Limited Designations by Industry, 2012. 
 
Because the original Commission Report did not break down the 
designation data by industry, it is impossible to disaggregate that data 
longitudinally.  The Report does note that fourteen of the nineteen 
household appliance warranties were full in 1977–78; only four are 
                                                 
 110.  Id. 
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today.111  Across all of the industry categories, there are few full 
warranties remaining. 
2. Coverage 
The question of warranty coverage encompasses the duration of the 
warranty, the scope of the warranty (i.e., what parts are covered), and the 
remedies available under the warranty (i.e., what the warrantor will do if 
a product is defective—e.g., provide parts only or parts and labor).112  
The Bureau found, in general, that coverage in 1977–78 was at or above 
1974 levels.113  Specifically, fourteen warranties showed an increase in 
coverage, fifteen showed no change, five showed both an increase in one 
or more aspects of coverage and a decrease in another aspect or aspects, 
and six showed a decrease in coverage.114 
Unfortunately, the original Commission Report reduced the analysis 
of warranty coverage to a binary question: did the warranty increase 
coverage or decrease coverage since passage of the Act?115  Because the 
underlying detail was excluded, it is impossible to compare this area 
across the decades.  In the authors’ analysis, two coverage questions 
were asked: what is the length of the warranty, and does it cover both 
parts and labor?  In reviewing the results, a third question emerged: is the 
length “tiered,” providing reduced warranted benefits over time?  The 
authors found that most of the 2012 warranties had fairly good coverage.  









                                                 
 111.  Id. at 16. 
 112.  Id. at 16–17. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. at 17–18. 
 115.  See id. at 16–17.  Note that in the original report, warranties could both increase and 
decrease coverage if, for instance, an RV maker used to warrant parts-only for the entire RV and 
subsequently began warranting parts and labor, but only for the chassis.  In the original report, these 
were counted both as having increased and having decreased.  Id. 
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 Average Length 
(in months) 
Tiered Warranty? 
 Yes No 
Household Appliances 33 7        36.8% 12   63.2% 
Mobile Home/RV 34 5        38.5% 8   61.5% 
Automobiles 36 4      100.0% 0     0.0% 
Home Entertainment 12 0          0.0% 4 100.0% 
Table 3.  Warranty Length and Tiering by Industry, 2012. 
 
 Parts Parts & Labor 
Household Appliances 2 10.5% 17         89.5% 
Mobile Home/RV 1   7.7% 12         92.3% 
Automobiles 0   0.0% 4       100.0% 
Home Entertainment 0   0.0% 4       100.0% 
Table 4. Coverage of Parts-Only vs. Parts & Labor by Industry, 2012. 
 
As one might suspect, the length of the warranty generally 
corresponds to the price of the item being warranted—more-expensive 
items like cars and homes carry longer warranties than less-expensive 
items like music players and televisions.  The large-ticket items 
(household appliances, mobile home/RV, and automobiles) had an 
average of three-years duration, while the home entertainment products 
had an average of one-year duration.  Additionally, there are very few 
warranties in the sample that cover only parts; parts-and-labor coverage 
is nearly ubiquitous (92.5%).  However, over half of the warranties 
carried the complexity of tiered coverage.  These warranties generally 
classified the coverage chronologically, offering most coverage 
immediately after purchase and lesser coverage in the months following 
the sale.  This tiering not only adds length to the warranty texts, but also 
increases its complexity for consumers. 
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3. Readability 
As previously indicated, one of the MMWA’s strategic purposes was 
to improve consumer understanding of warranties.116  Toward that end, 
the Act requires that a written warranty “fully and conspicuously disclose 
in simple and readily understood language the terms and conditions of 
such warranty.”117  Thus, the Bureau and the authors analyzed the 
readability of the warranties, the “ease with which consumers can read a 
written text.”118  The Bureau assessed readability by applying the Flesch 
Reading Ease formula to arrive at a score for each warranty.119  This 
scoring formula has been in use since the 1940s, and continues to be in 
wide use today.120  In this scale, the higher the number, the easier the text 
is to read—a score of 90–100 is considered “very easy,” while a score 
below 30 is considered “very difficult.”121  Several states have 
implemented statutes requiring insurance policies to have a Flesch 
Reading Ease score of 40 or 45, or greater, to ensure a minimum of 
readability.122  The readability analysis performed on 2012 warranties 












                                                 
 116.  See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. 
 117.  Magnuson-Moss Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 102(a), 88 Stat. 2183, 2185 (1975) (codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 2302(a) (2012)).  
 118.  IMPACT REPORT, supra note 81, at 18. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  See generally Rudolf Flesch, A New Readability Yardstick, 32 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 221 
(1948) (detailing formula). 
 121.  IMPACT REPORT, supra note 81, at 18. 
 122.  See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-80-206(a)(1) (West 2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-
297(a) (West 2012); DEL CODE. ANN. tit. 18, § 2741(a) (West 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
627.4145(1) (West 2011). 
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Table 5. Warranty Readability by Industry, 1974 to 2012.   
Higher numbers are more readable. 
 
 
Table 6. Warranty Readability by Industry, 1974 to 2012.  













 1974 1977–78 2012 
Household Appliances 36 44 31 
Mobile Home/RV 20 29 30 
Automobiles 32 40 36 
Home Entertainment 42 38 29 
    
All Categories 31 38 31 
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 The Bureau found that the 1977–78 warranties were slightly more 
readable than the 1974 warranties; however, “most [of the] warranties 
analyzed [fell] into the category of ‘difficult’ reading, far short of the 
statute’s standard of ‘simple and readily understood.’”123  The replicated 
study found that the average readability level of the warranties has 
returned to pre-Act levels.  However, that aggregation does not tell the 
whole story.  In fact, the variability in warranty readability has also been 
reduced dramatically over the decades: while the range of Reading Ease 
scores in 1974 was 22 points (from 20 to 42), the range in 2012 was only 
7 points (from 29 to 36).124  Note that if we exclude Mobile Homes and 
RVs from the analysis, the average Reading Ease score goes from 36 in 
1974 to 43 in 1977–78, to 31 in 2012—a remarkable decline. 
Also applicable is a related reading ease formula that uses the same 
inputs as the Flesch score, converting it into a U.S. grade level.  This 
approach, the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level formula, nets a number that 
equates to the number of years of education generally required to 
understand the text.125  Applying it to the 2012 warranties, the average 
Grade Level was as follows: 13.8 for automobiles; 15.6 for home 
entertainment; 14.7 for household appliances; and 15.0 for mobile 
homes/RVs.  The lowest warranty had a grade level of 10.5, while the 
highest had a grade level of 19.8, effectively requiring a post-graduate 
degree to understand. 
4. Length of Warranty 
As previously indicated, one of Congress’s goals in enacting the 
MMWA was to enable consumers to differentiate between more or less 
reliable products.126  This ability to differentiate would, in turn, lead 
consumers to purchase the more reliable products and produce economic 
rewards for the suppliers of such products.127  In order for the consumer 
to differentiate, however, the consumer needs to read the warranty.  
Thus, the Bureau measured the textual length of a warranty because it 
presumed that this length would influence whether a consumer is likely 
                                                 
 123.  IMPACT REPORT, supra note 81, at i. 
 124.  Id. at 20, tbl. 3. 
 125.  J. PETER KINCAID ET AL., NAVAL TECHNICAL TRAINING COMMAND, DERIVATION OF NEW 
READABILITY FORMULAS FOR NAVY ENLISTED PERSONNEL ii (1975). 
 126.  See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text; see also IMPACT REPORT, supra note 81, at 
21 (stating that one of Congress’s goals “was to encourage consumers to read and use warranties 
when shopping for products”). 
 127.  See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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to read the warranty completely.128  The Bureau noted, however, that 
“longer warranties may also indicate that crucial information left out of 
earlier warranties was added after the Act and the FTC Rule went into 
effect.”129  Further, “[l]onger warranties may also be less ambiguous and 
make it easier for consumers and servicers to agree upon their meaning 
when a defect needs repair.”130 
The Bureau measured length by counting words;131 this study does as 
well.  While the original report omitted word counts for each individual 
warranty, it did provide information averaged by product category.132  
Thus, we can compare across years.  The Bureau found that warranties in 
1977–78 had increased in length over their 1974 counterparts.133  Further, 
it found that the Act was partly to blame for the increase because the 
FTC’s “disclosures required under Rule Sections 701.3(a)(7), (8) and (9) 
added an average of 44 words, accounting for 71% of the average length 
increase noted in 1977–78 warranties”134 and the “step-by-step 
explanation for warranty service under Section 701.3(a)(5) of the FTC 
Rule.”135  However, part of the increase in length also resulted from the 













                                                 
 128.  IMPACT REPORT, supra note 81, at 21. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. at 22. 
 133.  See id. (“Findings show that 33 (83%) of the 40 current warranties increased in length over 
their 1974 counterparts, while only 7 (17%) decreased.”). 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. 
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 1974 1977–78 2012 
Household Appliances 305 450 1004 
Mobile Home/RV 339 489 2676 
Automobiles 292 312 2159 
Home Entertainment 351 511 1033 
    
All Categories 319 455 1666 
Table 7. Average Word Count of Warranties by Industry, 1974 
to 2012. 
 
In 2012, as the table above details, the trend is unmistakable: 
warranties are several times longer than they were in 1977–78.  The 
amount of growth ranged from approximately double the length to six 
times the length; on average, the warranties were over three-and-a-half 
times as long.  Thus, even accounting for the laudable effect of providing 
crucial information, the increased length is problematic in that consumers 
are much less likely to read these longer warranties. 
5. Significant Limitations, Exclusions, and Disclaimers 
The initial Commission Report examining the warranty differences 
before and after the Act focused on three warranty provisions explicitly 
addressed in the MMWA: limitation of the warranty to the original 
owner, disclaimer of implied warranties, and disclaimer of consequential 
damages.137  In the 2012 warranty analysis, the same characteristics were 
examined, while other, more anecdotal characteristics were also noted. 
First, the Bureau examined the restriction of warranty protection to 
the original owner.  This was done first because the Act does not allow a 
supplier who gives a full warranty to restrict the warranty to the original 
purchaser.138  In addition, however, even in the case of a limited 
                                                 
 137.  Id. at 23. 
 138.  Magnuson-Moss Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 104(b)(4), 88 Stat. 2183, 2188 (1975) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2304(b)(4) (2012)) (“The duties under subsection (a) [of this section] extend 
from the warrantor to each person who is a consumer with respect to the consumer product.”).  
Section 101(3) defines “consumer” as including a person to whom the product was transferred.  
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warranty, the Bureau felt that a limitation to the original purchaser was 
problematic because it allowed the supplier to escape warranty liability if 
the consumer product was sold and it prevented the subsequent purchaser 
from having any assurance of product quality.139  In 2012, second 
purchasers of the products studied are more likely to enjoy warranty 
coverage than they would have in 1974, but less likely than they would 
have in 1977–78.  Specifically, the Bureau found that, in 1974, 43% of 
the warranties contained a limitation to the original purchaser.140  In 
contrast, in 1977–78, only 23% of the warranties had such a limitation.141  
In 2012, this proportion increased to approximately 35%.  Further, three 
additional 2012 warranties shorten coverage for subsequent owners, and 
two allow for subsequent ownership coverage only if the transfer is 
approved in writing by the manufacturer and, in one case, a $250 fee is 
paid. 
 
 1974 1977–78 2012 
Household Appliances 7   36.8% 2  10.5% 5 26.3% 
Mobile Home/RV 7   53.8% 5  38.5% 6 46.2% 
Automobiles 0     0.0% 0    0.0% 0   0.0% 
Home Entertainment 3   75.0% 2  50.0% 3 75.0% 
  
All Categories 17   42.5% 9  22.5% 14 35.0% 
Table 8. Warranties Limited to Original Owner by Industry, 1974 to 2012. 
 
The second area of examination is the disclaimer of implied 
warranties.  As previously explained, Congress believed that, in order to 
ensure basic warranty protection for consumers, the Act needed to 
prohibit a supplier from disclaiming the state law implied warranties 
                                                 
 
Magnuson-Moss Act § 101(3) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3)). 
 139.  See IMPACT REPORT, supra note 81, at 23. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. 
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when that supplier gave a written warranty.142  Thus, § 108(a) provides 
that: 
[n]o supplier may disclaim . . . any implied warranty to a consumer 
with respect to such consumer product if (1) such supplier makes any 
written warranty to the consumer with respect to such consumer 
product, or (2) at the time of sale, or within 90 days thereafter, such 
supplier enters into a service contract with the consumer which applies 
to such consumer product.143 
This prohibition applies to both full and limited warranties.144  Further, 
any such disclaimer made in violation of the MMWA is ineffective for 
purposes of the MMWA and state law.145  In 1974, 55% of the pre-Act 
warranties carried disclaimers of the implied warranties, while only 5% 
(two warranties) had this language in 1977–78.146  The 2012 warranty 
analysis shows that the disclaimer of implied warranty is returning to 
consumer warranties, despite its prohibition by the MMWA: 32.5% of 
the warranties included the language.147  Most of these were in the 
mobile home/RV (46% of warranties carried the disclaimer) and 
household appliance (31% carried the disclaimer) industries. 
 
 1974 1977–78 2012 
Disclaimed Implied Warranty 22 55.0% 2 5.0% 13 32.5% 
Table 9. Warranties Disclaiming Implied Warranties, 1974 to 2012. 
Finally, the Commission examined the exclusion of consequential 
damages, which are allowable under the MMWA if they are clearly and 
                                                 
 142.  S. REP. NO. 93-151, at 7 (1973); H.R. REP. NO. 93-1107, at 29 (1974), reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 1974 WL 11709 (stating a need for “safeguards against the disclaimer or 
modification of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness on consumer products where a 
written warranty is given with respect thereto”). 
 143.  Magnuson-Moss Act § 108(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a)). 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Magnuson-Moss Act § 108(c) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2308(c)).  
 146.  IMPACT REPORT, supra note 81, at 24. 
 147.  To compound the problem, there are some courts that fail to recognize that a disclaimer of 
an implied warranty is ineffective if a written warranty or service contract is given.  See, e.g., Zanger 
v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., No. 05-CV-72300-DT, 2005 WL 3163392, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 28, 
2005) (allowing disclaimer of implied warranties even when a written warranty was given); Prousi v. 
Cruisers Div. of KCS Int’l, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 768, 774 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (same), vacated,  No. Civ.A. 
95-6652, 1999 WL 551359 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1999). 
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conspicuously disclosed in the warranty.148  The replicated study 
indicates that the rise in the exclusion of consequential damages that 
began after the Act’s enactment has continued.  Thus, most warranties 
significantly reduce the damages that a consumer can recover.149  From 
1974 to 1977–78, the Commission noted an increase in the exclusion of 
consequential damages, from 45% to nearly 73%, with the greatest 
increase occurring in the household appliance group.150  In 2012, the 
proportion was higher: almost all warranties, 95%, disclaimed 
consequential damages. 
 
 1974 1977–78 2012 
Excluded Consequential 
Damages
18 45.0% 29 72.5% 38 95.0% 
Table 10. Warranties Excluding Consequential Damages, 1974 to 2012. 
Beyond these quantifiable characteristics, some of the 2012 
warranties also carried additional notable attributes.  One of the home 
entertainment warranties, for example, requires the consumer to pay for 
shipping the item one-way back to the manufacturer.  One of the mobile 
home/RV companies provides a short warranty—unless the consumer 
agrees to binding arbitration and no lawsuits, in which case the length is 
extended.  Two other mobile home/RV manufacturers require the 
consumer to pay a fee for any warranty claim, and also force arbitration 
with no avenue for appeal. 
6. Analytical Summary 
Based on comparing the results from 1977–78 and 2012, it is clear 
                                                 
 148.  IMPACT REPORT, supra note 81, at 25.  Although the statutory language that requires 
conspicuous notation of the consequential damages limitation only applies to full warranties, see 
Magnuson-Moss Act § 104(a)(3) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(3)), the MMWA regulations 
extend the requirement to limited warranties where the consumer product costs more than $15.  See 
16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a)(8) (2012) (“Any warrantor warranting to a consumer by means of a written 
warranty a consumer product actually costing the consumer more than $15.00 shall clearly and 
conspicuously disclose in a single document in simple and readily understood language, the 
following items of information: . . . [a]ny exclusions of or limitations on relief such as incidental or 
consequential damages . . . .”). 
 149.  It should be noted that the reduction is mainly relevant to the recovery of property damage 
caused by defective products because U.C.C. § 2-719(3) provides that a limitation on the recovery of 
personal injury damages for defective consumer products is per se unconscionable.  U.C.C. § 2-
719(3) (2013). 
 150.  IMPACT REPORT, supra note 81, at 25. 
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that warranties have become significantly less consumer-friendly over 
that period.  From a readability and consumer understanding standpoint, 
the differences are staggering: warranties are nearly three-times longer 
on average, and most require some college education to understand.  This 
comes at a time when 42.7% of Americans aged twenty-five and over 
have never attended college.151  Further, the protections afforded by 
consumer warranties have also shrunk.  Fewer warranties are designated 
as full, and the vast majority exclude consequential damages.  A third of 
consumer warranties disclaim implied warranties—a disclaimer that is 
unlawful under the MMWA!152  More warranties today limit their 
coverage to the original owner of the product, and many offer tiered 
coverage, reducing protections over the life of the warranty. 
While in some cases, consumer warranty protections are not as 
inadequate as they were before the passage of the Act, the trend is 
moving in that direction.  In terms of readability, however, the situation 
is actually worse than in 1975: warranties are longer and generally more 
difficult to parse than at the time of the MMWA’s enactment. 
IV. LACK OF ENFORCEMENT OF THE MMWA PROVISIONS 
As the above evidence demonstrates, many suppliers are violating 
the MMWA.  The FTC is not, however, actively pursuing these violators.  
Further, consumer suits are not discouraging violators.  Thus, in addition 
to failing to achieve its first purpose of promoting consumer 
understanding and its second purpose of providing consumers with basic 
protection, the MMWA also is failing to achieve its third purpose of 
making the FTC more effective so that it can improve the position of the 
consumer in the marketplace, as well as its fourth purpose of enabling 
the consumer to pursue his own remedies against a MMWA violator. 
A. Generally 
In attempting to achieve the third strategic purpose, Title II of the 
MMWA granted the Commission the power to “seek either a preliminary 
or permanent injunction against parties committing acts or practices 
which are unfair or deceptive to consumers”;153 “assess civil penalties 
                                                 
 151.  Educational Attainment in the United States: 2012—Detailed Tables, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/2012/tables.html (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2014). 
 152.  Magnuson-Moss Act § 108(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a)). 
 153.  S. REP. NO. 93-151, at 3 (1973); see also 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2012). 
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(up to $10,000 per violation) against those suppliers of consumer 
products who knowingly commit unfair or deceptive acts or practices in 
violation of Section 5(a) (1) [sic] of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act”;154 and “initiate civil actions in United States district court seeking 
reasonable and appropriate consumer redress” as a remedy for 
“consumer injury resulting from violations of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act.”155  Although redress under this latter provision does 
not include exemplary or punitive damages, relief includes “recission 
[sic], reformation, refunding of money, return of property, or other 
appropriate relief for those injured by an unfair or deceptive act or 
practice.”156  All of these powers granted to the FTC apply to violations 
of the MMWA because any violation of the MMWA is a violation of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act.157 
In spite of this significant expansion of the FTC’s power, in recent 
years, the FTC has not utilized this power to prosecute the MMWA 
violations identified above in section III.C.5.158  In the past, the FTC did 
use its expanded powers to hold MMWA violators accountable.  In fact, 
between the years 1979 and 1999, the FTC issued at least twenty-three 
cease-and-desist orders against twenty-two different manufacturers for 
violations of the MMWA.159  For example, in 1998, the FTC brought suit 
against Gateway 2000 for misleading warranty claims and disclaiming 
                                                 
 154.  S. REP. NO. 93-151, at 3; see also 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A). 
 155.  S. REP. NO. 93-151, at 3; see also 15 U.S.C. § 57b. 
 156.  S. REP. NO. 93-151, at 3; see also 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b). 
 157.  Magnuson-Moss Act § 110(b) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2310(b)) (“It shall be a violation of 
section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act . . . for any person to fail to comply with any 
requirement imposed on such person by this title (or a rule thereunder) or to violate any prohibition 
contained in this title (or a rule thereunder).”).  
 158.  The FTC’s ongoing docket is available at: Cases and Proceedings, FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION, http://ftc.gov/os/adjpro/index.shtml (last visited Dec. 20, 2014).  Actions seem to drag 
on for years at a time, and generally end not with an adjudication per se, but rather a consent order. 
 159.  See, e.g., In re Tiger Direct, Inc., 128 F.T.C. 517 (1999); In re Gateway 2000, Inc., 126 
F.T.C. 888 (1998); In re Rustevader Corp., 122 F.T.C. 359 (1996); In re Macy’s N.E., Inc., 118 
F.T.C. 643 (1994); In re Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 F.T.C. 655 (1993); In re Montgomery Ward & 
Co., No. 932 3116, 1994 WL 287594 (Apr. 22, 1994); In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., 115 F.T.C. 695 
(1992); In re The Good Guys, Inc., 115 F.T.C. 670 (1992); In re Nobody Beats The Wiz, Inc., 114 
F.T.C. 278 (1990); In re Jeep Eagle Corp., 113 F.T.C. 792 (1990); In re Craftmatic/Contour Org., 
Inc., 105 F.T.C. 366 (1985); In re Peabody Barnes, Inc., 104 F.T.C. 503 (1983); In re Centurion 
Int’l, Inc., 103 F.T.C. 84 (1984); In re Worthington Ford of Alaska, Inc., 98 F.T.C. 895 (1981); In re 
Montgomery Ward & Co., 97 F.T.C. 363 (1981), vacated, Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Fed. 
Trade Comm’n, 691 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Bob Rice Ford, Inc., 96 F.T.C. 18 (1980); In re 
Nolan’s R.V. Ctr., Inc., 95 F.T.C. 294 (1980); In re George’s Radio and Television Co., 94 F.T.C. 
1135 (1979); In re Korvette’s, Inc., 94 F.T.C. 318 (1979); In re Woodland Mobile Homes, Inc., 94 
F.T.C. 290 (1979); In re Arnaudville Indus., Inc., 93 F.T.C. 1061 (1979); In re Madison Mobile-
Modular Homes, Inc., 93 F.T.C. 1068 (1979); In re Renault U.S.A., Inc., 93 F.T.C. 905 (1979). 
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the implied warranty.160  In addition, a couple of decades earlier, around 
the time of the MMWA enactment, the FTC went after a mobile home 
manufacturer that had a mid-1970s warranty that the FTC deemed, in 
1978, to be unlawful post-MMWA.161  Consequently, the FTC issued a 
permanent injunction against using the warranty and ordered the 
manufacturer to communicate with the prior purchasers to tell them of 
the correct warranty terms.162  The manufacturer sued, and the district 
court (later affirmed by the Fourth Circuit) ruled that both the permanent 
injunction and the compulsory notification were within the FTC’s 
jurisdiction.163 
In recent years, however, despite a fairly extensive docket, the FTC 
has not pursued a MMWA violation since the Tiger Direct164 case in 
1999—nearly fifteen years ago.165  In addition, apart from a nearly 
$300,000 fine imposed on Gateway, even when the FTC was pursuing 
MMWA violations, it did not exhort penalties from the violators.166  
Thus, compliance with the MMWA need not even be on corporate radar 
screens. 
B. Private Enforcement 
In addition to a lack of enforcement by the FTC, consumers are not 
utilizing the private redress provisions of the MMWA to hold suppliers 
accountable for the violations of the Act.  As outlined previously, § 
2310(d) provides for a federal cause of action for a consumer who is 
                                                 
 160.  In re Gateway 2000, Inc., 126 F.T.C. 888 (1998).  In a consent order, Gateway agreed to 
pay nearly $300,000 to the FTC.  Id. at 905.  An excerpt from a FTC news release at the time 
provided: “A final order with Gateway 2000 requires the company to pay $290,000 to settle FTC 
charges that Gateway made false and misleading statements in advertising its refund policy and 
misleading claims about its on-site warranty service.  The Commission required that the money be 
paid to the U.S. Treasury because individual consumers who should have received a refund could 
not be identified.”  Announced Actions for January 7, 1999, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, http:// 
www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/1999/01/announced-actions-january-7-1999 (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2014). 
 161.  Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Virginia Homes Mfg. Corp., 509 F. Supp. 51, 53 (D. Md. 1981), 
aff’d, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Virginia Homes Mfg. Corp., 661 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1981). 
 162.  Id. at 53, 59. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  128 F.T.C. 517 (1999). 
 165.  Id.  To reach this conclusion, the authors reviewed all of the 823 case entries on the FTC 
webpage from November 1999 through February 2014.  See Cases and Proceedings, supra note 158.  
Further, the authors reviewed the 104 cases involving the MMWA found on the Westlaw Federal 
Antitrust & Trade Regulation—Federal Trade Commission Decisions database, and the 589 cases 
found on the Westlaw Federal Antitrust & Trade Regulation—Federal Cases database. 
 166.  See supra note 158–59 and accompanying text.  Only Gateway involved a penalty. 
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injured by a supplier, warrantor or service contractor’s, inter alia, failure 
to comply with any MMWA obligation.167  Recognizing that such 
consumer actions may involve small amounts, § 2310(d) also provides 
for the award of attorneys’ fees and costs to a prevailing consumer.168  
However, the authors’ research demonstrates that relatively few 
consumers are taking advantage of the MMWA private redress 
provisions.169 
The first area of research that the authors conducted was to examine 
all of the reported and available unreported state MMWA claims and 
federal appeals court cases for the past ten years.  The authors also 
examined the federal district court cases for 2013 and 2014.  This 
research revealed that very few of the cases sued for a violation of a 
substantive MMWA provision.  The research in this area was 
challenging because although a complaint might allege a violation of the 
MMWA, in many cases, what was actually being alleged was a breach of 
warranty under the MMWA.  Further, not every case contained details as 
to the nature of the violation alleged.  Thus, if the complaint alleged a 
violation of the MMWA and the authors found no mention of a breach of 
warranty under the MMWA, they treated the case as a violation of a 
substantive provision of the MMWA.  Utilizing this method (which is 
likely to over-count substantive violations), the authors found that, of the 
approximately one hundred ninety-five reported state cases that 
mentioned a MMWA claim, only approximately fifty-three indicated suit 
for a violation of the MMWA, and in only two cases could the authors 
ascertain an alleged violation of a substantive MMWA provision.170  In 
addition, in the forty-seven federal appeals court cases and the forty-two 
district court cases, the authors found only twelve circuit court cases and 
eight district court cases that seemed to allege a substantive violation 
rather than a breach of warranty.  That number is likely even smaller, 
however, because in only five of the circuit cases and two of the district 
court cases were the authors able to find language demonstrating an 
allegation of a violation of a substantive MMWA provision. 
                                                 
 167.  15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) (2012). 
 168.  15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2). 
 169.  For example, although the authors’ research revealed that consumers brought 
approximately 562 breach-of-warranty cases involving consumer goods in the past ten years, only 
165 of those cases included a MMWA claim. 
 170.  Of the approximately one hundred ninety unreported state cases in the past ten years that 
mentioned a MMWA claim, approximately forty-two seemed to involve a violation, however, in 
only about six of the cases could the authors find an alleged violation of a substantive MMWA 
provision. 
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The authors surmised, however, that this dearth of cases might be 
due to the fact that consumers were not bringing the cases to court, but 
were instead pursuing arbitration and going through other informal 
dispute resolution mechanisms.  Unfortunately, this supposition 
regarding arbitration cannot be either corroborated or refuted by 
researching the number or substance of commercial law cases that go to 
arbitration because databases for such research do not exist. 
However, in an interview with Scott Cohen of Krohn & Moss, a 
consumer law attorney with seventeen years of experience who manages 
all appeals cases for his firm, we learned that Mr. Cohen does not believe 
that arbitration is the reason for the low number of MMWA cases.171  Mr. 
Cohen says this for two reasons.  First, most consumer lawyers will fight 
arbitration because it is their belief that arbitration generally does not 
serve the needs of the consumer.172  Thus, even if a case ultimately goes 
to arbitration, there usually is a court record of the case.  Mr. Cohen’s 
second basis for his belief is that, in his experience, many law firms do 
not know about the MMWA and thus do not sue for either MMWA 
violations or breach of warranty or service contract under the Act.173  He 
cites as an example the state of California where, when Mr. Cohen’s firm 
first started bringing complaints in the state, he discovered that most 
consumer complaints for automobiles were brought under California’s 
lemon law (the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act),174 but not under 
the MMWA.175 
Mr. Cohen’s statement regarding attorneys’ lack of knowledge is 
buttressed by the authors’ research that demonstrates that although each 
state’s lemon law varies, all states have them176—yet, in California, for 
example, while approximately 323 cases were brought under the Song-
Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, only 114 of the cases included a 
MMWA claim.177  One might argue that this finding is due to the 
superiority of the lemon law cause of action; however, this position is 
belied by comparing the requirements of most lemon laws to the 
                                                 
 171.  Interview with Scott M. Cohen, Attorney, Krohn & Moss (July 11, 2013). 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1790 (West 2009). 
 175.  Interview with Scott M. Cohen, supra note 171. 
 176.  See Learn More About State Lemon Laws, COUNCIL OF BETTER BUSINESS BUREAUS, 
http://www.bbb.org/council/programs-services/dispute-handling-and-resolution/bbb-auto-line/learn-
more-about-state-lemon-laws/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2014) (providing links to Lemon Laws for all 
fifty states plus the District of Columbia). 
 177.  The authors conducted a search of all Song-Beverly cases from 2003 to 2013 and obtained 
this data. 
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MMWA.  For example, while a lemon law claim generally requires that 
the defect complained of substantially impairs the value of the 
automobile, a claim for breach of warranty under the MMWA does not 
require substantial impairment.178  In addition, if the lemon law requires 
a breach of the UCC express warranty, it generally encompasses a 
narrower range of breaches than the MMWA breach of written 
warranty.179  Finally, although the MMWA prohibits the disclaimer of 
the UCC implied warranties if a supplier gives a written warranty, if a 
supplier gives an express warranty under the UCC, that supplier can 
disclaim the UCC implied warranties so long as the supplier follows the 
fairly simple requirements of UCC § 2-316.180  Specifically, to disclaim 
the implied warranty of merchantability, the supplier must simply use the 
phrase “as is” or something similar,181 or mention merchantability in the 
disclaimer and, if the disclaimer is in writing, make the disclaimer 
conspicuous.182  To disclaim the implied warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose, the supplier must use the phrase “as is” or something 
similar,183 or disclaim the warranty with a conspicuous writing.184  Thus, 
a consumer suing under the MMWA, as opposed to a state law claim, 
may bring suit on an implied warranty that has purportedly been 
disclaimed. 
Despite this anecdotal evidence, it is possible that consumers are 
pursuing MMWA claims in large numbers, but are doing so through 
arbitration.  While such may be beneficial in terms of compensation for 
the consumer, it does not serve to dissuade suppliers from violating the 
MMWA because the arbitration of most commercial law claims is done 
in secret.185  Thus, arbitration does not provide feedback to either 
                                                 
 178.  Interview with Scott M. Cohen, supra note 171. 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  See U.C.C. § 2-316 (2012). 
 181.  U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a). 
 182.  U.C.C. § 2-316(2). 
 183.  U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a). 
 184.  U.C.C. § 2-316(2). 
 185.  Interview with Samantha Zyontz, Doctoral Candidate, MIT Sloan School of Management 
(July 2013).  In the conversation concerning an article that she co-wrote with University of Kansas 
Law Professor Christopher Drahozal, Zyontz explained that she and Drahozal had to sign a 
confidentiality agreement before being allowed access to the arbitration cases that they researched 
for the article.  The article is Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, An Empirical Study of 
AAA Consumer Arbitrations, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 843 (2010).  Further, Professor 
Drahozal states that it is difficult to obtain data on arbitrations because, unlike court cases, 
arbitrations are secret.  Christopher R. Drahozal, John M. Rounds Professor of Law and Associate 
Dean for Research and Faculty Development, University of Kansas School of Law, Lecture on 
Consumer Arbitrations Before the American Arbitration Association, available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AdRUgomaFss.  For a broader look at secrecy and privacy in 
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regulators or manufacturers about what is in and out of bounds, and by 
operating so confidentially, it removes the disincentive for manufacturers 
to comply with the Act.  If suppliers violate the Act and they get caught, 
no one is the wiser because the suppliers take the case to binding secret 
arbitration. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDRESSING THE IDENTIFIED 
PROBLEMS 
The above research demonstrates that, to varying degrees, none of 
the four purposes of the MMWA are being fully realized.  To help 
improve consumer understanding of current warranties, this article 
proposes that the FTC promulgate new readability regulations; require 
the use of a new, standardized, warranty display; and launch an 
education campaign to educate consumers regarding the warranty 
display.  In addition, to alleviate the lack of enforcement of the MMWA, 
this article provides ideas on how to educate both consumers and 
attorneys regarding the availability of the MMWA actions, suggests a 
way to increase FTC enforcement of the MMWA, and proposes a slight 
modification of the Act to buttress private enforcement. 
A. Improve Consumer Understanding 
Over the last few decades, the content and length of warranties has 
not only reverted to the levels seen prior to enactment of the MMWA, 
but has gotten worse.186  Additional mechanisms are needed, then, to help 
consumers understand warranties and compare warranty protections 
across multiple products.  To provide this assistance, the authors 
recommend new readability regulations and a new, standardized, 
warranty display. 
1. Readability Law 
To redress the problem of consumers not understanding the 
warranties that they are receiving—and the limitations therein—the 
language used needs to be accessible to the average consumer.  The FTC 
                                                 
 
arbitration, see Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 
1211 (2006). 
 186.  See supra Part III.C. 
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attempted to address this problem via 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a), requiring that 
“[a]ny warrantor warranting to a consumer by means of a written 
warranty a consumer product actually costing the consumer more than 
$15.00 shall clearly and conspicuously disclose in a single document in 
simple and readily understood language, the following items of 
information . . . .”187  However, a more concrete approach can be found 
in the readability score requirements in several states’ insurance 
statutes.188  If it so chose, the FTC could add this requirement to 16 
C.F.R. § 701.3(a). 
State readability laws largely rely on the same measurement, the 
Flesch Reading Ease test.189  Developed by Rudolf Flesch in 1948, the 
rating focuses primarily on average sentence length and average word 
length.190  Higher scores indicate material that is easier to read; within 
the 30–49 range, material is considered “difficult,” while scores 70 or 
above are “fairly easy,” “easy,” or “very easy.”191  In addition to state 
usage, the U.S. Department of Defense uses a similar measurement for 
the text of department manuals.192 
The authors propose that the regulations set the reading score 
threshold at 45.  While this score places the content within the difficult 
range, it does roughly correspond to a high-school-graduate’s reading 
level.193  Of a handful of state insurance readability statutes surveyed, 
some put the threshold at 40 while others place it at 45,194 so this level is 
comparable to other, similar documents.  Further, note that the study of 
current warranties found that most carry a reading score in the low 
30s.195  Setting a threshold of 45 would dramatically improve consumers’ 
ability to understand the parameters of their warranties. 
                                                 
 187.  16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a) (2012). 
 188.  See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-80-206(a)(1) (West 2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-
297(a) (West 2012); DEL CODE. ANN. tit. 18, § 2741(a) (West 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
627.4145(1) (West 2011). 
 189.  See, e.g., id. 
 190.  Flesch, supra note 120, at 228–30. 
 191.  Id. at 230 tbl. 5. 
 192.  DEP’T OF DEF., STANDARD PRACTICE FOR MANUALS, TECHNICAL: GENERAL STYLE AND 
FORMAL REQUIREMENTS § 4.3.3. (1995). 
 193.  Flesch, supra note 120, at 225.  A grade-level formula that allows for some comparison and 
analysis is the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level test, also co-developed by Rudolf Flesch.  For more 
information, see generally KINCAID ET AL., supra note 125.  
 194.  See supra note 188. 
 195.  See supra Part III.C.3. 
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2. Uniformity of Displaying Standard Warranty Terms 
As initially enacted, the MMWA sought to create uniformity among 
written warranties by standardizing their designations as full or 
limited.196  “Full” warranties are those that meet the minimum warranty 
standards, while “limited” warranties do not.197  Given that less than 15% 
of the contemporary warranties examined had any portion that was full, 
however, that distinction is no longer as illustrative as it once was.198  An 
analog to this evolution can be found in food labeling.  In 1966, the Fair 
Packaging and Labeling Act established basic disclosure rules for food 
items.199  Under the legislation, labels were required to state the 
product’s identity, where it was made (and by whom), and the net 
quantity of the contents.200  Over the ensuing decades, however, 
marketers followed the law while adding confusion (e.g., making nutrient 
claims like “light” and “low fat”).201 
To address this return to consumer confusion, Congress passed the 
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act in 1990, nearly 25 years later.202  
In addition to enabling new standards for health and nutrition claims, this 
law required that almost all foods bear a unified “Nutrition Facts” label 
with a standard set of informational elements.203  The result is a box now 
familiar to most Americans: 
                                                 
 196.  15 U.S.C. § 2303(a) (2012). 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  See supra Part III.C.1. 
 199.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1461 (2012). 
 200.  15 U.S.C § 1453(a). 
 201.  See, e.g., Bruce A. Silverglade, The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act—Progress to 
Date and Challenges for the Future, 15 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETTING 148, 148 (1996) (“The 
mandate for the FDA’s new regulations came on the heels of a decade of misleading claims for 
products ranging from ‘light’ cheesecake that had more fat and as many calories per serving as 
traditional cheesecake to high fiber breakfast cereals promoted as the newest miracle weapon in the 
fight against cancer.”). 
 202.  Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (1990) 
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2012)). 
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information about disclaimer of implied warranty because—though 
forbidden by law—its inclusion may encourage warrantors to discourage 
claims by incorrectly showing such claims as disallowed.  Using a 
similar format as the Nutrition Facts box above, a corresponding 
Warranty Facts box could look like: 
 
 
The binary boxes (entitled “Yes” and “No”) on the proposed label are 
structured so that any item marked “No” provides less coverage than one 
marked “Yes.”  This allows a consumer to easily scan the checkboxes 
and determine the relative merit of these warranty terms, without parsing 
an extended text or needing to open a product’s packaging to find a 
warranty booklet.  Such a box would once again help consumers easily 
compare potential purchases based on the strength of their warranties. 
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B. Consumer and Attorney Education 
Once the FTC has enacted the regulations above concerning the 
warranty box, it will need to run a consumer education campaign.  The 
FTC can fund this campaign using the penalties and fines mentioned in 
Part V.C.206  Once the campaign is funded, the FTC can run educational 
advertisements with catchy slogans.  For example, “Check the Chart” 
may prompt consumers to make sure to examine the new warranty box to 
review the protections provided. 
In addition to educating consumers about the new warranty box, the 
FTC can also educate consumers and attorneys as to consumers’ private 
enforcement rights under the MMWA and the availability of attorneys’ 
fees.  Such education is needed because, as demonstrated in Part III, 
consumers are not pursuing MMWA claims as vigorously as one might 
suppose, given the widespread MMWA violations.  In addition to 
encouraging the FTC to act, the authors will contribute to the education 
enterprise by condensing this article down to a trade article and 
forwarding the article to the FTC and other entities that are concerned 
with consumer protection.  The trade article will alert the FTC to the 
existing violations, and will alert the other entities to the availability of 
MMWA actions and the advantage of pursuing such actions. 
Further, although the FTC educates suppliers as to the requirements 
of the MMWA,207 we believe that the FTC should also educate three 
additional groups: law school legal clinics, private attorneys, and state 
attorneys general.  Again, the money to finance this educational effort 
would come from the fees that the authors have suggested that Congress 
appropriate to the FTC.208 
The consumer law clinics of law schools are prime candidates for 
having the manpower and the desire to pursue MMWA actions.  In 
addition, pursuing MMWA actions will benefit the clinics in that the 
cases will bring in attorneys’ fees that will help the clinics to continue 
pursuing their mission.  Further, the cases are also generally small and 
fairly simple, enabling students to begin and start a case during the 
course of their experience.  The belief that law schools might not be 
doing this is suggested by the fact that none of the legal clinics at the 
                                                 
 206.  See infra Part V.C. 
 207.  Businessperson’s Guide to Federal Warranty Law, BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., 
http://www.business.ftc.gov/documents/bus01-businesspersons-guide-federal-warranty-law (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2014). 
 208.  See infra Part V.C. 
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three Oregon law schools are pursuing MMWA actions as a part of their 
caseload.209  Those cases that are more complicated or that involve large 
numbers of consumers should likely be brought by a private law firm or 
a state attorney general. 
C. Increased FTC Enforcement 
The growth in MMWA compliance issues in the decades since the 
law’s passage corresponds with a reduction in enforcement by the 
FTC.210  The first recommendation, then, is to increase the level of 
enforcement by the FTC of the Act’s provisions. 
Under the MMWA, the FTC has broad enforcement powers.  The 
Commission is empowered to seek injunctive relief for deceptive 
warranty actions, as well as for any violation of the Act itself.211  Further, 
the FTC Act grants that body broad enforcement powers to combat 
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”212  The 
limitations on administrative enforcement of the MMWA, then, are not 
matters of statutory authority.  Rather, they appear to be initiated by 
limited funding and a shift in agency focus. 
Although the federal discretionary budget and the FTC’s resources 
both shrank after 1979, the federal discretionary budget has rebounded.  
Thus, this article suggests that more funds need to be allocated to the 
FTC, given the immense scope of the agency’s responsibilities.  In 1979, 
only a few years after the MMWA was enacted, the FTC had a staff of 
1,746 full-time equivalent (FTE) employees.213  In that same year, 
overall federal discretionary spending (excluding defense) was 
approximately $400 billion (inflation-adjusted).214  Ten years later, the 
FTC’s staff had shrunk by nearly half, to 894 FTE employees.215  Overall 
                                                 
 209.  Clinical Practice Areas, WILLAMETTE U. C. L., https://willamette.edu/wucl/centers/ 
clp/clinics/index.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2014); Clinics and Externships, OR. L., 
http://law.uoregon.edu/clinics-externships/clinics/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2014); Lewis & Clark Legal 
Clinic, LEWIS & CLARK L. SCH., https://law.lclark.edu/clinics/legal_clinic/ (last visited Dec. 20, 
2014).  
 210.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 211.  15 U.S.C. § 2310(c) (2012). 
 212.  15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)–(2), (c). 
 213.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2014 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 35 
(2013) [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION], available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
reports/fy-2014-congressional-budget-justification (follow “FY 2014 Congressional Budget 
Justification (4.78 MB)” hyperlink). 
 214.  D. ANDREW AUSTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TRENDS IN DISCRETIONARY SPENDING 22 
fig.3 (2014), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34424.pdf. 
 215.  CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 213, at 35. 
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federal discretionary (non-defense) spending had shrunk as well, down to 
approximately $285 billion.216  In the twenty-five years since, however, 
the federal discretionary budget has rebounded while the FTC rolls have 
not.  In 2013, federal discretionary (non-defense) spending had grown to 
$525 billion—far in excess of the 1979 level.217  Yet FTC staffing had 
only been restored to 1,176 FTE employees.218  Budgeting and spending 
priorities have shifted. 
In addition to suggesting that additional federal general funds be 
allocated to the agency, however, there is another complementary 
approach.  Proceeds from MMWA actions could be directed back to the 
agency for further enforcement.  Currently, the Commission retains two 
categories of fees: those related to pre-merger notifications and those 
from the do-not-call registry.219  The authority to retain these fees is 
found in the agency’s appropriations bill.220 
Undoubtedly, there are significant political barriers to altering the 
appropriations process, as there have been throughout modern history.221  
However, this change is unlikely to reduce current federal funds, because 
there have been no fines levied in many years.222  The primary opposition 
is likely to come from business groups seeking to keep enforcement at 
current levels, and from political factions who want to diminish federal 
regulatory systems generally. 
By expanding the scope of agency funds retention to include the 
proceeds of MMWA enforcement actions, however, multiple positive 
outcomes are achieved.  The agency gains a new revenue stream to 
enforce the provisions of the legislation.  In doing so, there is a renewed 
incentive to pursue such enforcement.  Finally, the Commission has a 
greater incentive to pursue financial penalties in addition to injunctive 
relief. 
                                                 
 216.  AUSTIN, supra note 214, at 22 fig.3. 
 217.  Id.  Note that this level is after spending was completed on the Recovery Act and before 
2013 sequestration caps took effect, so it is a “normalized” snapshot.  Id. 
 218.  CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 213, at 35. 
 219.  Id. at 37. 
 220.  Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, 125 Stat. 786, 910 (2011). 
 221.  See generally, e.g., Richard F. Fenno, Jr., The House Appropriations Committee as a 
Political System: The Problem of Integration, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 310 (1962).  Or, more 
historically, Mark S. Peacock, The Origins of Money in Ancient Greece: The Political Economy of 
Coinage and Exchange, 30 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 637 (2006).  Money and politics are forever 
intertwined. 
 222.  See supra Part IV. 
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D. Private Enforcement 
An additional solution to the lack of governmental resources for the 
prosecution of MMWA violations is the use of private litigation by 
consumers to supplement the FTC’s enforcement efforts.223  The 
MMWA currently provides consumers with a federal cause of action for, 
inter alia, violations of the MMWA.224  In order to provide for a greater 
amount of deterrence, this Article proposes a slight revision of the Act to 
allow for penalties to be imposed for particularly egregious violations. 
As previously noted, a lack of knowledge by attorneys concerning 
the Act’s provisions hampers the deterrence that might otherwise be 
achieved through consumer lawsuits.225  Consumers have, however, 
utilized the MMWA to pursue manufacturers for MMWA violations.  An 
example of this type of suit is Lawhorn v. Joseph Toyota, Inc., where a 
handful of purchasers launched several class-action suits against a 
Toyota dealer for misleading warranty language.226  Here, the dealer had 
language disclaiming implied warranties, but also included the required 
FTC window sticker that allowed implied warranties.227  The lower court 
found that the window sticker language was enough to overcome the 
confusion created by the implied warranty disclaimer in the sale 
documents, and the consumers appealed.228  The state intermediate 
appeals court overturned, stating: 
                                                 
 223.  The utility of the private right of action to supplement governmental enforcement was well 
stated by Senator Strom Thurmond in describing the private right of action portion of RICO: “this 
private cause of action was included as an incentive for victims of organized crime activity to redress 
wrongful actions against their legitimate businesses.  Because of the limited resources available to 
assist the Government in its fight against organized crime, it was believed that ‘private attorneys 
general’ could supplement Government efforts.”  Hearing on Oversight on Civil RICO Suits Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 2 (1985) (opening statement of Senator Storm Thurmond, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary), quoted in Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1, 20 (2002). 
 224.  Magnuson-Moss Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 110(d)(1), 88 Stat. 2183, 2191 (1975) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) (2012)) (“a consumer who is damaged by the failure of a 
supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation under this title . . . may bring 
suit”).  Although the MMWA places considerable constraints on the ability to bring claims in federal 
court, see Magnuson-Moss Act § 110(d)(3) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1)) (requiring $50,000 
amount in controversy and 100 named plaintiffs for a class action), and the courts have placed 
additional unwarranted limitations on this private right of redress, see Steverson, supra note 2, at 
169–97, such constraints and limitations are beyond the scope of this article. 
 225.  It is hoped that this Article will help to alleviate some of the ignorance concerning the 
MMWA. 
 226.  750 N.E.2d 610, 611, 613 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2001). 
 227.  Id. at 613–14. 
 228.  Id. at 613. 
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we conclude that the mere act of supplying a standard FTC window 
form cannot relieve a dealer of its duty to comply with the terms of the 
MMWA.  There is no indication that either Congress or the FTC 
intended to permit a dealer to clearly violate the MMWA with specific 
language in one contract document while hiding behind the claimed 
curative effect of a general, vague statement in another form 
document . . . .229 
Although the Toyota case gives no indication of the remedy sought by 
the plaintiffs, we know that the available remedy was limited to 
economic (as opposed to personal injury) damages,230 equitable relief, 
and attorneys’ fees.231  Given the high level of MMWA violations, these 
types of suits are not providing sufficient deterrence to violators.  
Something more is needed. 
The MMWA federal cause of action for statutory violations is only 
one in a long list of statutes that provide for a private right of action.  In 
determining whether to modify the existing MMWA, it is helpful to 
examine the various categories of private actions that currently exist.  
Professor Pamela Bucy, who wrote a comprehensive article on the 
advantages of so-called private justice, provides some guidance.232  In 
that article, she identified three models of private justice: 
“Victim” actions are brought by persons who have been injured or 
damaged by an actor’s conduct.  Such actions have been statutorily 
created, and judicially implied from existing statutes. 
                                                 
 229.  Id. at 614. 
 230.  Although the authors believe that the MMWA does not preclude an award of personal 
injury damages (see Steverson, supra note 2, at 191-196), the majority of courts that have addressed 
this issue have found that personal injury damages caused by the breach of a written warranty or an 
implied warranty are not allowed for a MMWA claim.  See, e.g., Voelker v. Porsche Cars N. Am., 
Inc., 353 F.3d 516, 525 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 748 F.2d 1058, 1066 
(5th Cir. 1984)) (finding that personal injury claims based on a breach of warranty are not 
cognizable under the MMWA); Grant v. Cavalier Mfg., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1334–35, 1338 
(M.D. Ala. 2002) (citing Boelens, 748 F.2d at 1065–66) (finding that mental anguish damages are 
not available under MMWA because they are personal injury damages).  The two lead cases upon 
which the other cases have relied are: Gorman v. Saf-T-Mate, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 1028, 1035 (N.D. 
Ind. 1981) (consumers may not recover personal injury damages for MMWA claims), and Boelens, 
748 F.2d at 1060–66 (personal injury claims arising from breach of warranty are not cognizable 
under MMWA, rejecting plaintiff’s argument that 15 U.S.C. § 2311 (2012) means only that the 
MMWA does not create any new substantive rights to personal injury damages, but if state law 
provides that right, then it is cognizable under the MMWA). 
 231.  Magnuson-Moss Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 110(d)(1)–(2), 88 Stat. 2183, 2191 (1975) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) (2012)) (consumer may bring suit for damages and other legal 
and equitable relief and a finally prevailing consumer may recover costs and expenses, including 
attorneys’ fees). 
 232.  Bucy, supra note 223. 
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“Common good” private justice actions are brought by plaintiffs who 
have suffered no personal injury but who have been given authority to 
sue malfeasors because their lawsuits, which bring additional resources 
to law enforcement’s efforts, are viewed as helpful to the common 
community.  Examples include citizen suits, generally available in 
environmental laws and in some consumer protection statutes, and the 
civil False Claims Act’s qui tam provisions. 
“Hybrid” private justice actions are available only to plaintiffs who 
have been injured but, depending on the extent of the injuries and 
recoveries, resemble either “victim” or “common good” actions.  Many 
of the “hybrid” actions proceed as class actions.233 
Professor Bucy points to the following statutes as examples of victim 
statutes: the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act, the Consumer Product Safety Act,234 the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Federal Tort Claims Act.235  Under each 
of these laws, the plaintiff must be harmed by the defendant’s violation 
of the statute.  Further, the statutes only provide for remedial relief—
when damages are available, they are limited to compensatory 
damages.236  The difficulty with victim statutes is that, while they 
compensate injured parties, they are not designed to supplement 
governmental enforcement efforts, and thus do not deter future 
violations.237 
Hybrid private justice actions combine aspects of the victim actions 
and the common good actions in that the plaintiff has to have been 
harmed by the defendant’s action; however, the actions are able to deter 
future conduct through the availability of class actions, attorney’s fees, 
and, in some cases, treble damages.238  Professor Bucy explains that class 
actions often entice private attorneys to bring such actions because they 
                                                 
 233.  Id. at 13. 
 234.  Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972, 15 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2012) (“Any person who shall 
sustain injury by reason of any knowing (including willful) violation of a consumer product safety 
rule, or any other rule or order issued by the Commission may sue any person who knowingly 
(including willfully) violated any such rule or order in any district court of the United States in the 
district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, shall recover damages sustained 
and may, if the court determines it to be in the interest of justice, recover the costs of suit, including 
reasonable attorneys’ fees . . . .”). 
 235.  Bucy, supra note 223, at 13 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–2000 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 2520 
(2012); 15 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2012)). 
 236.  Id. at 15, 17–19. 
 237.  See id. at 15 (“when these [victim] causes of action have been created, there is almost no 
mention of vindicating the public’s rights, supplementing public regulatory efforts, or other similar 
expressions of serving the common good”). 
 238.  Id. at 18. 
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provide lucrative compensation for the attorneys.239  Thus, the private 
attorneys supplement the government enforcement efforts.  Further, class 
actions, attorneys’ fees, and treble damages all can lead to large 
judgments that serve to deter future wrongdoing.240  Professor Bucy cites 
securities fraud offenses and violations of the Clayton Act, the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act, and the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO) as examples of hybrid statutes.241 
The final category of private justice actions is the common good 
action.  In this action the plaintiffs need not show any harm to 
themselves.  Rather, the statutes give these plaintiffs “the right to sue on 
behalf of the party who has been harmed or simply because public harm 
is threatened.”242  The plaintiffs in these suits are commonly referred to 
as “private attorneys general” in that the plaintiff sues “to vindicate 
public interests not directly connected to any special stake of her 
own.”243  Accordingly, instead of seeking compensatory damages, the 
plaintiffs seek “injunctive or other equitable relief aimed at altering the 
practices of large institutions.”244  Statutes that provide for common good 
actions include many environmental statutes, some consumer protection 
                                                 
 239.  Id. 
 240.  Id. at 17–18. 
 241.  Id. at 18–19 (citing Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012); Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
of 1986 (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012); Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (2012)).  The Clayton Act provides that “any person who shall be 
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue 
therefor [sic] in any district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or 
is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold 
the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”  15 U.S.C. 
§ 15(a).  The CFAA “creates a number of criminal offenses pertaining to improper accessing and use 
of computers, and computer fraud.”  Bucy, supra note 223, at 18 n.81.  In addition to criminal 
penalties, § 1030(g) provides a private cause of action: “Any person who suffers damage or loss by 
reason of a violation of the section may maintain a civil action against the violator to obtain 
compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief.”  18 U.S.C. § 1030(g).  Several 
cases demonstrate its potential as a private cause of action.  See, e.g., Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. 
Sys., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942, 960–61 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (class action was brought under the CFAA, 
and the parties settled the action for $2.1 billion with $147.5 million in attorneys’ fees). 
 242.  Bucy, supra note 223, at 31. 
 243.  Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the First Amendment, 103 MICH. L. 
REV. 589, 590 (2005); see also Eileen Guana, Federal Environmental Citizen Provisions: Obstacles 
and Incentives on the Road to Environmental Justice, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 43 (1995) 
(“Environmental citizen suit provisions are different” from other private enforcement statutes 
because “[t]hey grant citizens the ability to act as real private attorneys general to sue on behalf of 
the community at large, rather than to vindicate individual rights resulting in economic loss”).  Thus, 
environmental citizen suit provisions typically provide a means to obtain injunctive relief and do not 
afford the citizen an avenue to recover damages resulting from violations of environmental laws.  Id. 
 244.  Morrison, supra note 243, at 590. 
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statutes, and the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act.245  
Specifically, the Clean Water Act,246 the Clean Air Act,247 the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),248 and the Endangered Species 
Act249 “authorize citizens to sue alleged violators directly through citizen 
enforcement actions.”250  The consumer protection statute is the 
Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972.251 
Although the common good environmental citizen suits have met 
with success, this article proposes the use of a hybrid model for the 
MMWA because it is closer to what currently exists and it avoids the 
problems that shadow the common good statutes.  As Professor Greve 
explains in his criticism of such statutes, Congress puts private enforcers 
to work with reluctance.252  “Behind this reluctance lies a set of simple, 
                                                 
 245.  Bucy, supra note 223, at 31 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012)); see also Michael S. Greve, 
The Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 65 TUL. L. REV. 339, 339–40 (1990) (citations 
omitted) (“Private enforcers have been put to work for purposes ranging from consumer protection 
to the prevention of procurement fraud to curbing insider trading . . . . Virtually all federal 
environmental statutes contain a citizen suit provision that, typically, allows ‘any person to sue 
private parties for noncompliance with statutory provisions or with standards and regulations issued 
under the statute.  Groups and individuals suing under these provisions have sustained no injury or, 
at most, a minimal injury-in-fact.  They act not as victims who redress a wrong done to them but as 
‘private attorneys general.’”). 
 246.  33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2012) (“any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf 
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other governmental 
instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) 
who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an 
order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation”). 
 247.  42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2012) (“any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf 
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other governmental 
instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution) 
who is alleged to have violated (if there is evidence that the alleged violation has been repeated) or 
to be in violation of (A) an emission standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued 
by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation”). 
 248.  42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (2012) (“any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf 
(1)(A) against any person (including (a) the United States, and (b) any other governmental 
instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) 
who is alleged to be in violation of any permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, 
prohibition, or order which has become effective pursuant to this chapter”). 
 249.  16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (2012) (“any person may commence a civil suit on his own 
behalf (A) to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other governmental 
instrumentality or agency (to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution), 
who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter or regulation issued under the 
authority thereof”). 
 250.  Melissa Powers, Citizen Suits in U.S. Environmental Law: An Overview and Assessment, 
11 ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 125, 135 (2013). 
 251.  15 U.S.C. § 2073(a) (2012) (“Any interested person (including any individual or nonprofit, 
business, or other entity) may bring an action in any United States district court for the district in 
which the defendant is found or transacts business to enforce a consumer product safety rule or an 
order under section 2064 of this title, and to obtain appropriate injunctive relief.”). 
 252.  See Greve, supra note 245, at 343 (“While Congress has on occasion put private enforcers 
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intuitive assumptions.  Private citizens are generally competent judges of 
their own rights and interests.  Therefore, they can be relied upon to right 
the wrongs that are done to them, such as breaches of contract, torts, or 
trespass.”253  Professor Greve believes that private citizens are terrible at 
judging the interests of others, however, including (and especially) 
public interests. 254  Additionally, he contends that private enforcers may 
simply “hunt for bounties [because they] do not care about the societal 
consequences of their actions.”255 
While expanding the private enforcement section of the MMWA 
may be difficult politically, only a minor change is needed to increase the 
deterrence of violations.  To align the Act with Professor Bucy’s hybrid 
model, Congress need only add a treble damages provision for egregious 
violations.  The other elements of the model—class actions and 
attorneys’ fees—already exist in the statute.  However, while the 
proposed alteration is minor, it could lead to a significant increase in 
compliance with the law. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
After comparing both the current state of consumer warranties and 
the levels of administrative and judicial enforcement, it is clear that the 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is not fully satisfying its intended aims.  
After nearly forty years, it is appropriate to make some minor 
modifications in statute and rule to take into account the changed 
manufacturing, retail, and technological landscape.  Through a 
combination of strengthened enforcement, clearer warranty disclosures, 
and education, this landmark legislation can better meet the needs of the 
twenty-first century consumer. 
  
                                                 
 
to work for public purposes, it has done so rarely, reluctantly, and in recognition of the problematic 
nature of its undertaking.”). 
 253.  Id. at 343–344. 
 254.  Id. at 344. 
 255.  Id. 
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Appendix: Manufacturers’ Warranties Selected 
 
Category	 Original Today
Appliances Admiral Dell 
 Amana Amana 
 Carrier Carrier 
 Emerson InSinkErator 
 Fedders Fedders 
 Friedrich Friedrich 
 Frigidaire Frigidaire 
 GE GE 
 Gibson HP 
 Hardwick Cuisinart 
 Hoover Hoover 
 Kelvinator Fisher & Paykel 
 Maytag Maytag 
 McGraw-Edison Skil (Bosch) 
 Modern Maid Miele 
 Roper Sub-Zero 
 Tappan Viking 
 Westinghouse Westinghouse 
 Whirlpool Whirlpool 
   
Mobile Home/RV Airstream Thor 
 Avco Fleetwood 
 Champion Champion 
 Coachman Coachmen 
 Commodore Commodore 
 Guerdon Clayton Homes 
 Midas Tiffin 
 Monitor Jayco 
 Redman Excel Homes 
 Skyline Skyline 
 Superior Coach Gulf Stream Coach 
 Vesely Keystone 
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Automobiles American Motors Honda 
 Chrysler Chrysler 
 Ford Ford 
 GM GM 
   
Home Entertainment JVC JVC 
 KLH Apple 
 Magnavox Samsung 
 Zenith LG 
 
 
